The task of assessing trade imbalances – whom to blame and what should be done – involves both economics and politics. Trade imbalances are the result, for instance, of household decisions about how much to save and how much – and what – to consume. They are also the result of government decisions: how much to tax and spend (which determines the amount of government savings or deficits), investment regulations, exchange-rate policies, and so forth. All of these decisions are interdependent.

For example, America’s huge agriculture subsidies contribute to its fiscal deficit, which translates into a larger trade deficit. But agricultural subsidies have consequences for China and other developing countries. Were China to revalue its currency, its farmers would be worse off; but in a world of free(r) trade, US farm subsidies translate into lower global agricultural prices, and thus lower prices for Chinese farmers. By extending its largesse to rich corporate farms, the US may not have intended to harm the world’s poor, but that is the predictable result.

This poses a dilemma for Chinese policymakers. Subsidizing their own farmers would divert money from education, health, and urgently needed development projects. Or China can try to maintain an exchange rate that is slightly lower than it would be otherwise. If the IMF is to be evenhanded, should it criticize America’s farm policies or China’s exchange-rate policies?

Ascertaining whether a country’s trade imbalances are the result of misguided policies or a natural consequence of its circumstances is also no easy task. A country’s trade deficit equals the difference between domestic investment and savings, and developing countries are normally encouraged to save as much as they can. Evidently, China’s population has more than responded to such admonitions. Stronger safety net programs might reduce the need for precautionary savings in the future, but such reforms cannot be accomplished overnight. Investment is high, but further investment growth risks misallocating money, so reductions in China’s trade imbalance may be hard to achieve.

Moreover, a change in China’s exchange rate would do little to alter the multilateral trade deficit in the US. Americans might simply switch from buying Chinese textiles to imports from Bangladesh. It is difficult to see how a change in China’s exchange rate would have a significant effect on either savings or investments in the US – and thus how it would redress global imbalances.

With the US trade deficit the major global imbalance, attention should focus on how to increase its national savings – a question that US governments have struggled with for decades, and one that was frequently debated when I was chair of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers. While it’s true that tax preferences might yield slightly higher private savings, the loss of tax revenues would more than offset the gains, thereby actually reducing national savings. We found only one solution: reduce the fiscal deficit.

In short, the US bears responsibility both for trade imbalances and the policies that might quickly be adopted to address them. The IMF’s response to its new mission of assessing global imbalances will thus test its battered political legitimacy. At its spring meeting, the Fund failed to commit itself to choosing its head on the basis of merit, regardless of nationality, and it did not ensure that voting rights are allocated on a more limited legitimate basis. Many of the emerging-market countries, for example, are still underrepresented.

If the IMF’s analysis of global imbalances is not balanced, if it does not identify the US as the major culprit, and if it does not direct its attention on America’s need to reduce its fiscal deficits – through higher taxes for America’s richest and lower defense spending – the Fund’s relevance in the twenty-first century will inevitably decline.

Sorprenent oi que Holanda sigui un “exportador net de persones” i en canvi Espanya el principal importador… Com s’explica que Hollanda perdi població? Doncs és l’efecte jubilació. Molta gent gran marxa cap a zones com Espanya per a retirar-se.

Aquí penjo el què diu al blog Demography Matters:

The Netherlands is the only country in Western Europe where emigrants outnumber immigrants. In 2005, an unprecedented 121 thousand persons left the country. Immigration totalled 92 thousand persons. Such a large negative netmigration is found nowhere else in Europe.

Emigrants outnumber immigrants since 2003
For decades, the number of people who came to settle in the Netherlands outnumbered those who were leaving the country permanently. This situation changed in 2003, when emigrants outnumbered immigrants for the first time. There seems to be no end to the emigration increase in the foreseeable future. In the first quarter of 2006 29 thousand persons left the Netherlands, 5 thousand more than in the same period one year previously and the negative net migration trend appears to continue and grow.

Of course details matter, while most people migrating fall in the 20-30 category there are some other trends. Some emigrants are getting older. This trend started in the 90´s as well.

Emigrants more often older people
Emigration increased in all age groups, but has particularly grown among older people. The population is ageing and the number of older people who consider emigration is also on the increase. The amount of emigrants over the age of 55 increased from 6 thousand in 1995 to 10 thousand in 2005. Spain and France in particular are popular destinations among older people. The majority of emigrants, however, are in their twenties and thirties.

When I first read the news about the governmental ban of the voodoo dolls in China I thought it was not that scandalous and I’m now surprised there has been so much blogs writing and debating about it. Why?

The best post I found is this one that also has many links to other related news and gives us more important information.

1- Those dolls were for teenagers to introduce themselves to black magic and to symbolically harm other people. I don’t think it’s a very educative practice for young people so I can understand the parents concern.

2- Is Voodoo that bad? As you can read in Wikipedia : “The cultural values that Vodou embraces center around ideas of honor and respect — to God, to the spirits, to the family and society, and to oneself. Since Vodou has such a community orientation, it is sometimes seen as an extention of the beliefs in the old Soviet Union, and, since the dissolution of the USSR, has drawn many Russian initiates. There are no “solitaries” in Vodou, only people separated geographically from their elders and house. A person without a relationship of some kind with elders will not be practicing Vodou as it is understood in Haiti and among Haitians.”

3- The ban started in Beijing after parents complains isn’t that civil society participation?

4- There are strong commercial interests from Saen Ha Co Ltd, the company (from Thailand) that was selling them. The dolls, made in 70 styles, generated around Bt3 million for her company and the more than 250 villagers in Chiang Mai’s Doi Saket, Chaiya Prakarn and Mae Rim districts who produce the dolls.

5- The old fashioned excuse realised by the government in order to ban them was also a mistake: the dolls encourage superstition and “promote feudalism and feudal beliefs.”

The problem is not really Voodoo nor the children education… but the same debate we also have in the western world between state and parents duties in educating children. Even if we accept that Voodoo is bad for children, I’ll not ban them but just make them only available to adult. Or even better, if you are the concerned parent, don’t buy them to your children or educate them better. The state doesn’t need/can be in charge of everything…

Not content with arresting its critics, the government is cracking down on those who listen to dissident views – even when these are set to music.
By IWPR staff (29/05/06)

Following the jailing of two men for listening to a song criticizing the government’s role in the Andijan violence last year, there are concerns for the safety of the poet who wrote the words.

After security forces opened fire on thousands of demonstrators in the city of Andijan on 13 May 2005, poet and singer Dadakhon Hasanov felt impelled to write something the very next day.

In the days following the Andijan violence, listeners to Radio Liberty’s Uzbek-language service, which is beamed into the country from Prague, heard a series of angry songs written and performed by Hasanov.

“Don’t say you haven’t heard….There was a massacre in Andijan,” one of them began, before accusing President Islam Karimov of presiding over an indiscriminate massacre.

While the government insists that fewer than 200 people died – few or none of them innocent civilians – human rights groups inside and outside the country say that based on eyewitness accounts, many hundreds of men, women and children were killed in cold blood by the security forces.

The official refusal to allow an independent investigation to clarify matters has led to a rift with the West, which President Islam Karimov previously courted.

Using images redolent of the Central Asian landscape, Hasanov sang of people being shot down like mulberries shaken from a tree, and children lying dead and bloodied like red tulips.

Karimov was described as an unjust “Shah” who ordered Kalashnikov bullets to fly and ignored his subjects’ “cries of suffering”.

Hasanov is a well known figure in Uzbekistan and his songs are widely circulated even though they never get airtime on the tightly controlled state broadcasting outlets.

He has an impressive track-record as a dissident – his works were first banned in the eighties at a time when no one would have believed Uzbekistan would ever be a separate country. Throughout the transition from Soviet republic to Uzbek nation-state, he has continued to use his songs, accompanying himself on a traditional lute or “tar”, to comment on events and criticize the powers that be.

“Hasanov only sings political, revolutionary songs about Uzbekistan – about how instead of becoming independent, the country has grown dependent on its dictator,” said Alisher Saipov, a journalist in southern Kyrgyzstan where there is a large ethnic Uzbek community.

“These songs raise people’s spirits. He’s singing about what ordinary people are thinking… [the songs] create euphoria and excitement, and sometimes make you want to cry.”

“That’s the reason the authorities persecute people who listen to these songs and pass them around.”

Hasanov was called in for questioning on 12 April and a criminal case has been opened accusing him of actions undermining the constitutional system – a grave charge which amounts to an accusation of plotting a coup d’etat – and “producing and distributing materials that threaten public safety and order”, presumably the music tapes.

He has not been detained but has been ordered not to leave the country, and his Tashkent home and car have been seized as security.

“He’s been arrested a few times [already], but he still stands up and expresses his views on every historic event, such as Andijan,” said a local human rights activist who remains anonymous because of fears for his safety.

In a recent interview with the AFP news agency, Hasanov said, “Why should I be afraid? If they shoot again, I will answer with songs.”
As in the Soviet days of “samizdat”, cassettes with Hasanov’s recordings are passed privately from hand to hand.

To date, it has been unusual for the post-Soviet Uzbek authorities to jail someone for possessing dissident music, although other literature such as leaflets from the banned Islamic group Hizb-ut-Tahrir has been used to secure convictions of Muslim extremists, real or imagined.

Last month two men – Hazrat Ahmedov, a 68-year-old pensioner, and pediatrician Jamal Kutliev, 58 – were sentenced to four and seven years respectively the western city of Bukhara. They were arrested in November last year, reportedly on the basis of an anonymous denunciation to the secret police.

They were then charged under the same “constitutional system” and “illegal materials” clauses as Hasanov, plus an additional provision which bans the illegal formation of public associations and religious organizations. This is likely to relate to their membership of the outlawed opposition party Erk.

Kutliev has led the local branch of Erk since 1990. Both he and Ahmedov were reportedly placed under heightened surveillance as part of the general post-Andijan crackdown, as the authorities pursued both open critics of the regime and other potential dissident voices.

“The two arrested in Bukhara belonged to the opposition, so other charges are brought against them accordingly,” said Ghofurjon Yoldashev, a former correspondent with Radio Liberty correspondent in Andijan, who pointed out that “even the police in Bukhara have their own cassettes of Hasanov recordings”.

Kutliev and Ahmedov are well-known and respected figures in the Bukhara area, so despite the secrecy surrounding the trial, many residents have heard what happened to them.

Before his arrest, Kutliev was the head of a children’s hospital in the town of Gidjuvan, where residents describe him as a decent and educated man. They also expressed shock that a pensioner like Ahmedov should be imprisoned.

As the human rights activist said, “His songs express the pain of the Uzbek people. And anyone who publicizes the feelings and pain felt by the people is persecuted by the dictatorship.”

There Was a Massacre in Andijan
(Translation of a song by Dadakhon Hasanov)

Don’t say you haven’t heard,
You well-dressed princesses.
Hey, you deaf and blind ones
-There was a massacre in Andijan.
On the president’s orders,
With Kalashnikov bullets
The people were shot at by his servants.
There was a massacre in Andijan

The Padishah [Shah] did not listen to the people,
He did not hear their cries of suffering,
He has not chosen the path of justice.

There was a massacre in Andijan
He let the armoured vehicles open crackling fire,
Killing young and old, Shooting,
shooting, shooting terribly.

There was a massacre in Andijan.
Shooting, cutting people to ribbons,
Hunting them down in the streets,
Like dogs biting their prey.

There was a massacre in Andijan.
Children died on the streets,
Bright red like tulips,
Shattered mothers were weeping,
There was a massacre in Andijan.

He destroyed a local community,
Shaken like fruit from a mulberry tree,
Both men and women.

There was a massacre in Andijan.
Women with babes in arms,
Pregnant women too,
Died begging for mercy.

There was a massacre in Andijan.
The whole world found out about this massacre,
Everyone was filled with anger.

There was a massacre in Andijan.
Fatherless sons born in the street
-That’s who did the shooting.
There was a massacre in Andijan.
The bastards who fired the shots
Are the kind who sleep with their mothers,
And are mired in their own excrement.

There was a massacre in Andijan
We tested our ruthless leader,
And found him a terrorist.
We were filled with hatred and sorrow.
There was a massacre in Andijan.
Uzbeks will not awaken,
Sunk in their fear,
Dictators will continue to shoot.

There was a massacre in Andijan.
Don’t say you haven’t heard,
You well-dressed princesses.

Hey, you deaf and blind ones
-There was a massacre in Andijan.

This article originally appeared in Reporting Central Asia, produced by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR). Reporting Central Asia is supported by the UK Foreign Office and the US State Department

It’s a good job, don’t you think so? I specially like the “free speeck give you herpes”? The problem is that chinese youth are not having fun with it… see this blog.
Is this the chinese version of the mohammad cartoons?

Monday, May 29, 2006; Posted: 2:20 a.m. EDT (06:20 GMT)

BEIJING, China (AP) — China’s government is warning that dumplings being sold for a popular festival this week might contain toxic chemicals used to keep their bamboo leaf wrappings bright green.

A spot check of merchants selling steamed dumplings for the Dragon Boat Festival on Wednesday found that many used copper sulphate or copper chloride, the China Daily newspaper said.

The dumplings, known as zongzi, are made of glutinous rice filled with red bean paste and wrapped in bamboo leaves. Chinese eat millions of them to mark the Dragon Boat Festival.

“The worst chemicals might lead to cancer or renal failure” Shen Xiangkun, an expert from the Food Research Institute in the populous central province of Henan, was quoted as saying.

The official China Consumer Association warned that normal leaves used to wrap dumplings for steaming are dark green, while bright green leaves might contain dangerous chemicals, the report said.

The newspaper didn’t say whether the government was taking any action to keep tainted dumplings off the market.

China suffers frequent cases of injuries and deaths from tainted or counterfeit food, ranging from bean curd made with paint to fake whiskey that contains industrial alcohol.

Browsing the web, I read about the publication of the so called ‘Diene Report’, an initiative of the Commission of Human Rights of the United Nations, with the goal to ‘map’ the practices of discrimination and racism throughout the world, and the measures taken by the governments to avoid them.

In this framework, I found an special report (you’re welcome, Lluc!), focused only in Japan.

You can read about which is the present situation of Ainu, Burakumin, People from Okinawa, Korean, and Foreign Workers, and (very interesting!), ‘hear the voice’ from the representatives of those communities, explaining how are they suffering this situation, and which are their biggest problems.

An English version is available here. Other publications of the Commission of Human Rights, are available clicking here…

May 25th 2006
From Economist.com
The United Nations searches for a secretary-general who can be a secretary to some and a general to others

THE corridors of the United Nations building in New York echo with gossip about the succession to Kofi Annan, the secretary-general, who steps down late this year. Among the possible candidates already being talked up and talked down are an Asian diplomat, a Jordanian prince, a Turkish economist, a woman head of state, even a former American president. But entertaining as such speculation might be, the right question to ask at this stage is not who the next secretary-general might be, but what sort of job the UN will allow him (or her) to do.

The terms of appointment are vague. The UN charter says only that the secretary-general is the organisation’s “chief administrative officer”. He “may bring to the attention of the Security Council” matters which threaten world peace. In effect, he relies on his moral stature and his powers of persuasion to get anything done, which has not proved a particularly reliable formula. Out of seven secretaries-general since 1946, only two have made much of a mark on the organisation—Dag Hammarskjöld and Kofi Annan. The first died tragically in the line of duty. The second, once hugely respected, will step down diminished by internal scandal and by the UN’s weakened role in world events.

The big everyday problem for any UN secretary-general is the fight to bring coherence to a fractious organisation that pulls in all sorts of directions at once. The contradictions and the horse-trading between different groups of countries—set against each other by size, by wealth, by geography, by ideology, by sheer cussedness—are dictating now the process of choosing the secretary-general, as they do everything that the UN touches.

Formally, the UN Security Council—a standing committee representing 15 countries—proposes the candidate for the secretary-general. The name goes for approval to the General Assembly, where each of the UN’s 191 countries has one vote. Within the Security Council, five permanent, veto-wielding members dominate: America, Britain, France, China and Russia. In the past, a deal between these five has determined the successful candidate, without much dissent from the other (temporary) members of the Security Council or from the General Assembly.

This year, the process may be a touch more contested. The G77, a block of 132 developing countries, wants much more of a role. Many of its members are annoyed that a proposed reform of the Security Council, launched last year, seems to have stalled. The reform might have added some permutation of India, Brazil, and one or two big African countries to the Security Council, along with Japan and Germany. Instead, there is still only one G77 member, China, with a permanent seat.

The stalling of reform in the Security Council has encouraged renewed bickering over the distribution of power everywhere within the UN. The poor countries say they are under-represented when decisions are made. The rich countries say they get a rough deal too, because the UN costs them too much and brings them too little.

As the jostling to succeed Mr Annan gets underway, India has proposed that the Security Council should send not one name, but three, to the General Assembly, and so give the General Assembly a real say in the appointment. A process such as this would, not incidentally, make the secretary-general more beholden to the General Assembly. At present, India complains, the secretary-general is prone to act as a secretary to the Security Council and a general to the General Assembly. John Bolton, America’s ambassador to the UN, has said that India’s scheme would amount to a “charter crisis”, stripping the Security Council of its designated role.

A tough secretary-general working closely with the General Assembly would tend to increase the UN’s supranational character—anathema to America and other big powers. It is commonly said that the permanent members of the Security Council would quietly prefer a weak secretary-general, and thus a weak UN, whereas the G77 would prefer a strong one.

The argument is not so simple. Here and there the positions are reversed. The oil-for-food scandal, when Iraqi oil quotas administered by the UN were diverted for private profit, and other lesser fiascos, have given weight to the arguments of America and other rich countries that the UN is stuffed with unsackable and unsuitable time-servers. One way forward might be to give the secretary-general more power to fix problems by hiring and firing personnel and moving budgets around. Mr Annan duly introduced such a proposal. But G77 countries sidetracked it, fearful that their own interests and placemen might suffer, and it is likely to stay that way until Mr Annan goes.

As for the candidates themselves, these are early days, but traditionally the job has rotated between regions. Asia claims its turn now. The last Asian secretary-general was U Thant of Burma, whose term ended in 1971. America and Britain counter that the sole criterion for appointment should be the quality of the candidate—and, by the way, central and eastern Europe has never had the job. The Chinese are politely, if predictably, insisting on the Asian variant, and they, of course, have a veto.

The result has been to focus attention on several declared Asian candidates (see table). These include Thailand’s deputy prime minister, South Korea’s foreign minister, and a Sri Lankan ex-UN bureaucrat. Other names being talked up unofficially include Jordan’s well-regarded ambassador to the UN, the Turkish head of the United Nations Development Programme, and the president of Latvia, who would be the first woman in the job. The name of Bill Clinton has been muttered here and there, a magnificent possibility but surely a very slight one.

The office left behind by Mr Annan will be a tiny bit tarnished. An independent investigation cleared him personally of any misconduct in the oil-for-food scandal, but it did worry about a lack of effective oversight, not to say some questionable dealing by Mr Annan’s son. Still, Mr Annan has been eloquent, sharp, charismatic, and beloved within the organisation. He managed for a long time to bridge gaps between north and south, poor and rich, while speaking credibly for reform. Finding a successor with those skills and qualities, let alone more besides, will not be easy

China and India: The race to growth (at McKinsey Quarterly)

The world’s two biggest developing countries are taking different paths to economic prosperity. Which is the better one?

Diana Farrell, Tarun Khanna, Jayant Sinha, and Jonathan R. Woetzel

2004 Special Edition: China today

First it was China. The rest of the world looked on in disbelief, then awe, as the Chinese economy began to take off in the 1980s at what seemed like lightning speed and the country positioned itself as a global economic power. GDP growth, driven largely by manufacturing, rose to 9 percent in 2003 after reaching 8 percent in 2002. China used its vast reservoirs of domestic savings to build an impressive infrastructure and sucked in huge amounts of foreign money to build factories and to acquire the expertise it needed. In 2003 it received $53 billion in foreign direct investment, or 8.2 percent1 of the world’s total—more than any other country.

India began its economic transformation almost a decade after China did but has recently grabbed just as much attention, prompted largely by the number of jobs transferred to it from the West. At the same time, the country is rapidly creating world-class businesses in knowledge-based industries such as software, IT services, and pharmaceuticals. These companies, which emerged with little government assistance, have helped propel the economy: GDP growth stood at 8.3 percent in 2003, up from 4.3 percent in 2002. But India’s level of foreign direct investment—$4.7 billion in 2003, up from $3 billion in 2002—is a fraction of China’s.

Both countries still have serious problems: India has poor roads and insufficient water and electricity supplies, all of which could thwart its development; China has massive bad bank loans that will have to be accounted for. The contrasting ways in which China and India are developing, and the particular difficulties each still faces, prompt debate about whether one country has a better approach to economic development and will eventually emerge as the stronger. We recently asked three leading experts for their views on the subject; their essays may be accessed on the pages that follow or by clicking on the titles below.

—Jayant Sinha

India’s entrepreneurial advantage
China has shackled its independent businesspeople. India has empowered them.

China: The best of all possible models
In an efficient market, the private sector is better than governments at allocating investment funds. But China isn’t an efficient market, and India has relatively little investment funding.

Sector by sector
The strength of the Chinese and Indian economies will actually be decided at the industry level.

Reforming India’s financial system Despite an underdeveloped financial system, India’s economy has made great progress. India’s financial sector is much more effective than its Chinese counterpart at allocating capital, bad debt seems to be under control, and the market share of more efficient private and foreign banks is creeping up. India must do better at mobilizing savings, for Indians are the world’s largest purchasers of gold, holding $200 billion worth—equal to nearly half of the country’s bank deposits. The country can take steps such as reducing its fiscal deficit, encouraging consumers to use banks, cutting the cost of bank intermediation, and developing the capital markets. China’s financial system Introduction

MGI’s research approach involved measuring China’s financial system performance against a comprehensive set of metrics, compared it to that of a range of other countries, and then assessed the flow of funds from savers to users of capital.

Read this chapter (PDF – 171 KB)

Chapter 2: Benchmarking China’s Financial System Performance MGI compares the performance of each component of China’s financial system to those in other emerging markets and developed countries, and examines the system’s overall financial depth, banking system, equity market, bond markets, and payments system. Read this chapter (PDF – 537 KB)

Chapter 3: The Effect of China’s Financial System Performance Despite ongoing reforms, the poor allocation of capital to private and small and medium-sized enterprises–the growth engine of China’s economy–lowers productivity and investment efficiency, skews the structure of the economy, and raises questions about the sustainability of China’s investment-led growth path. Read this chapter (PDF – 392 KB)

Chapter 4: The Value of Financial System Reform Addressing the shortcomings in China’s financial system could create enormous value for China’s economy. MGI estimates that reforming China’s financial system could boost GDP by up to $321 billion annually, bringing higher returns—and living standards—for Chinese savers. Read this chapter (PDF – 227 MB)

Chapter 5: Priorities for the Reform Agenda Because many problems in China’s financial system are interlinked, only coordinated, transparent, system-wide financial reforms can create the modern financial system China requires to support the country’s rapid growth and shift the economy onto a more sustainable development path. Read this chapter (PDF – 209 KB)

I just read this article from Zakaria. He just discoverd that what people wants is not just democracy and freedom but also good governance and development.

What the World Really Wants
Russians still rate democracy as something they like and value. But their big priority is the conditions that let them lead decent lives.
By Fareed Zakaria
Newsweek

May 29, 2006 issue – In Cheney’s narrative, Russia was a blooming democracy during the 1990s, but in recent years it has turned into a sinister dictatorship where people live in fear. In castigating Vladimir Putin, Cheney believes that he is speaking for the Russian masses. He fancies himself as Reagan at the Berlin wall. Except he isn’t. Had Cheney done his homework and consulted a few opinion polls, which are extensive and reliable in Russia, he would have discovered that Putin has a 75 percent approval rating, about twice that of President Bush.

Most Russians see recent history differently. They remember Russia in the 1990s as a country of instability, lawlessness and banditry. They believe that Boris Yeltsin bankrupted the country, handed its assets over to his cronies and spent most of his time drunk and dysfunctional. Yeltsin’s approval ratings by 1994 were below 20 percent and in 1996 he actually went into the single digits for a while. Russians see Putin, on the other hand, as having restored order, revived growth and reasserted national pride.

Why? Well, for the average Russian per capita GDP has gone from $600 to $4,500 during Putin’s reign, much, though not all of which, is related to oil prices. The poverty rolls have fallen from 42 million to 26 million. College graduates have increased by 50 percent and a middle class has emerged in Russia’s cities. And yet the backsliding that Cheney described is quite true, too. I’ve been critical of Putin power grabs for years now. But the truth is that even so, Russia today is a strange mixture of freedom and unfreedom. (The country publishes 90,000 books a year, espousing all political views.) Polls in Russia show that people still rate democracy as something they like and value. But in the wake of the 1990s, they value more urgently conditions that will allow them to lead decent civic and economic lives. We went to Iraq with similar blinders, believing that all people thirsted for was the end of Saddam. But when that meant the end of order, stability and civilized life, they were horrified and blamed us. If we had paid attention to this fundamental (and conservative) insight, we might not be in the mess we are in today in Iraq.

Or consider Nigeria. American officials have been debating how to help that country, by ensuring that its elected president, Olusegun Obasanjo, would not run for a third term (which would have required amending election laws). Last week the Nigerian Senate ruled out a third term, and Washington applauded. But in fact this whole drama is largely irrelevant to what is really happening in Nigeria. Over the last 25 years, the country has gone into free fall. Its per capita GDP has collapsed, writes Jeffrey Tayler in the April issue of The Atlantic, from $1,000 to $390. It ranks below Haiti and Bangladesh on the Human Development Index. In 2004 the World Bank estimated that 80 percent of Nigeria’s oil wealth goes to 1 percent of its people. Sectarian tensions are rising, particularly between Muslims and Christians, and 12 of the country’s 36 provinces have imposed Sharia. Violent conflict permeates the country, with 10,000 people dead over the last eight years. In this context, Obasanjo’s third term is really not the big issue that will determine Nigeria’s future. (Obasanjo has actually presided over a series of important improvements, which will probably collapse in his absence.) But these are the only issues that we talk about, because we’re spreading democracy.

The United States should stand for and help promote freedom around the world. But we can do so effectively only if we ally ourselves with the aspirations of the people we are trying to help. For many of them, the great struggle going on in so much of the world today is to end civil strife, corruption, extreme poverty and disease, which destroy not just democracy but society itself. And on those issues, I don’t think I’ve ever heard a speech by Dick Cheney.

Write the author at comments@fareedzakaria.com.

© 2006 MSNBC.com

URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12893650/site/newsweek/