China-Europa, de la luna de miel al "china threat"

En un nuevo artículo en IHT, The China Honeymoon is Over, David Shambaugh (el autor del interesante China-Europe the Emerging Axis -2004-) parece que ha cambiado de opinion. Tras las últimas reuniones entre China y la Unión Europea, el cambio de líderes en Europa y con la evolución de la opinión pública europea hacia posiciones más parecidas al “china threat” (amenza china) las relaciones entre ambos estan cambiando, y no para mejorar. Los temas de discrepancia no son nuevos: deficit comercial, derechos humanos, emisiones, etc… algunos han empeorado (depreciación del yuan) pero ahora Europa tiene una visión más unida e incluso más cercana a la de los Estados Unidos:

All these changes have created a greater convergence of perspectives and policies toward China across the continent than there has been in many years. The acrimony arising out of the arms embargo imbroglio of 2004-2005 has been replaced with a stronger sense of unity and political purpose.

This is true across the Atlantic as well, as the new EU mood better matches the “hedging” policies of the Bush administration toward China and the growing anger in Congress over a wide variety of trade-related matters.

Es el fin de la luna de miel, incluso la UE ha empezado a intentar recuperar terreno activamente en Africa, con la celebración de nuevas cumbres y paquetes de ayuda. En la de Lisboa, Barroso dijo en Financial Times:

“Imagine if we showed that with 1.5 billion people and 80 countries – almost half the UN membership – we can make a real impact, both regionally and as global partners,” European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso told the summit of the European and African Unions in Lisbon Saturday.

“Africa is becoming the new ‘grand chessboard’ on which the world’s great powers manoeuvre. China, the US, Australia, India and Malaysia are more and more pushing elbow to elbow to take control of mineral, oil and gas deposits in Africa,” EU Aid and Development Commissioner Louis Michel warned ahead of the summit.

Sin duda no parece viable la emergencia de un eje Europe-Africa a corto plazo, pero si es cierto que la presencia de China en Africa ha provocado una reactivación de Europa hacia el continente, lo que me parece solo puede ser bueno para Africa que se está convirtiendo en el “tablero de ejedrez emergente” de las potencias mundiales.

Sin embargo también debe tenerse en cuenta que la nueva estrategia de la UE en Africa parece que se aproxima a la de China: menor crítica de los régimenes corruptos e dictatoriales, derechos humanos, etc… y más ayudas e inversiones.

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El dólar: "nuestra moneda, vuestro problema"

Era previsible, lo habían argumentado numerosos economistas e incluso lo auguraba Rato en la cumbre del FMI en Singapur a principios de año: el enorme desequilibrio monetario y comercial entre China-EEUU-EU no podría continuar para siempre. La crisis de las subprime, el xoc del petróleo, subida de los cereales y la caída del dólar (y el yuan de rebote) frente al euro pueden ser el primer paso para deshacer este desajuste, o pueden contrarrestarse unas a otras y que al final no acabe cambiando casi nada.

Como explica Sebastian Mallaby en el Washington Post:

Nixon’s Treasury secretary, John Connally, told furious Europeans that the dollar was “our currency, but your problem.” (1971) The same could be said for today’s dollar trouble, which is why French President Nicolas Sarkozy said plaintively last week that “the dollar cannot remain someone else’s problem.” For the United States, a falling dollar means pricier imports but also an export boom that could carry the U.S. economy through its housing bust. Yet for France and other countries that use the euro, a weak dollar means a loss of competitiveness — not only against U.S. producers but also against dollar-pegging Asian exporters.

The falling dollar is a headache for the dollar-peggers, too. Their problem is the mirror image of the European one: Countries such as China and the Arab Gulf states are already experiencing an export boom that is overheating their economies. (…) So the world faces a dilemma. The last thing it wants is more dollar weakness, which is why central bankers in East Asia and the petro-states, which control most of the world’s official reserves, are not about to dump U.S. bonds and trigger a collapse in the greenback. But the world may also draw the lesson that an alternative global currency needs to be the long-term goal.

El problema es que EEUU no tiene un especial miedo en continuar devaluando su moneda y parece que prefiere esto a un riesgo de inflación, pero el resto del mundo preferiría un dolar más fuerte. Sin embargo un euro fuerte también permite a Europa obtener petróleo más barato, lo que también incide en sus capacidades de exportación y podría limitar el impacto. Por otra parte, la inflación se puede disparar en la eurozona, como parece que esta ocurriendo en España.

De momento la UE ha redoblado sus peticiones a China para que revalue el yuan, pues esta ahora es más perjudicial para la UE que para el dólar, así que mientras que ha sido EEUU quien hasta la fecha había realizado más presión en este sentido, ahora la pelota está en el tejado europeo. Y tampoco sabemos el alcance de las subrpimes para europa: “Tenemos la impresión de que las turbulencias no han terminado aún y que la solución es más difícil que lo previsto”, reconoció por su lado el comisario Joaquín Almunia.

Por su parte China tiene una enorme reserva de dólares y parece que debería realizar un mayor ajuste de sus reservas y comprar euros, pero esto significaría devaluar todavía más el dólar…
Así pues, el problema parece ser la interdependencia, pero esta es desigual y esto es por la centralidad del dólar en el mercado internacional. El hecho de que el yuan esté pagado al dólar y que el barril de petróleo se pague en dólares muestra la hegemonía tradicional de esta moneda y permite a EEUU hacer frente en una mejor posición a la crisis. Así, son los otros que tienen que adaptarse y por lo tanto es esperable que vayan a asumir mayores costes. Pero esta crisis también podría acabar con esta situación de privilegio del dólar si asiáticos, petro-estados y europeos se pusieran de acuerdo de que, de cara al futuro, hay otras alternativas mejores.

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Para una OCS norteamericana en Asia

Unos meses atras comentavamos en un post las maniobras de China e India en el Índico. Hoy debemos añadir la presencia, por primera vez, de tropas de la OTAN en las Seychelles (no esta mal como escala) y después en Somalia en el marco de un vuelta al continente africano (un Tour d’Afrique de la NATO) para saber un poco más ver Nato News.

Pero hay más, el candidato a presidente Rudy Giuliani ha declarado públicamente que Australia, Japón, Singapur, Israel y la India deberían formar parte de la OTAN. Japón, Australia, Nueva Zelanda y Corea del Sur en su momento también han demostrado cierto interés para incrementar la colaboración con esta institución.

En un artículo del año pasado en Foreign Affairs, Global NATO, Ivo Daalder y James Goldgeier decian lo siguiente:

Other democratic countries share NATO’s values and many common interests — including Australia, Brazil, Japan, India, New Zealand, South Africa, and South Korea — and all of them can greatly contribute to NATO’s efforts by providing additional military forces or logistical support to respond to global threats and needs. (…)

The Nalapat version of Asian NATO is reportedly a security community only composed of the so-called democratic nations. But the security mechanism being constructed by the US for Asia is supposed to open its door to all geopolitically important countries in the US-labelled “unstable arc,” and democracy is not the only criterion for membership. Take Pakistan and Kuwait. Washington has recently declared the two countries as its non-NATO allies.

Y el gobierno chino lo ha visto a su manera como muestra este parrafo del People’s Daily:

Currently, there are two Asian versions of NATO, with one being implemented by the United States and the other advocated by Madhav Nalapat, an adviser to India‘s National Security Council and director of the School of Geopolitics at Manipal Academy.

Deberíamos repasar quizás el magnífico articulo de Hemmer y Katzenstein “Why there is no NATO in Asia”:

A collective regional identity cast in a multilateral institutional form, however, has
been slower to emerge in Asia than in Europe. Looking to explain this difference,
many analysts have pointed to some of the obstacles to multilateralism that were
also seen as key during the early Cold War, including cultural diversity, disparate
economies, asymmetries in power, and historical animosities.123 To these factors we
would also add the continuing lack of Asian-PaciŽ c collective identity and the lack
of institutional experiences that could have helped provide a sense of community.

¿Siguen siendo validos estos argumentos? Hay problemas, como que Turquia forma parte de la OTAN sin compartir muchos de los valores europeos, etc… pero lo que me interesa esta en relación con un artículo de Xulio Ríos titulado ¿Política de Bloques en Asia? en Observatorio de Política China en el que apunta lo siguiente:

En los contactos mantenidos en Australia, China ha reclamado un “nuevo concepto de seguridad” para la región de Asia-Pacífico, en base a los principios ya conocidos de confianza mutua, igualdad, diálogo y cooperación. El énfasis chino se producía a los pocos días de iniciarse en el golfo de Bengala unos ejercicios navales de gran envergadura en los que participaban fuerzas de EEUU, India, Japón, Australia y Singapur, en lo que parece una réplica de las maniobras llevadas a cabo recientemente por la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghai (OCS). La participación de portaaviones, destructores, fragatas y submarinos ha convertido estas en las maniobras de mayor calado realizadas en la región y algunas fuentes le atribuyen ya el germen de una nueva entente a contraponer a la OCS.

Para mi la clave es que la OTAN es una organización en crisis de eficiencia y de legitimidad atrapada en Afganistán. El rival de la OTAN era el Pacto de Varsovia (la OTAN soviética), ambos para proyectar los intereses de seguridad de las grandes potencia en Europa. El Pacto de Varsovia no tenía miembros asiático, tampoco los tiene la OTAN.

Si vamos hacia una política de bloques creo que este no va a ser global, como fue la Guerra Fría, sino regional. China no podrá convertirse en una superpotencia, entre otras cosas por la presencia de Japón, India, etc… así, desde mi punto de vista, el choque entre bloques será intenso a nivel regional (Europa ya veremos como raecciona a esto) pero debil a nivel global. Por esto no tiene sentido una alianza global con la superpotencia en declive, sino una alianza asiática entre los que tienen intereses de seguridad allí (que no es el caso de la mayoría de paises de la OTAN).

Y en este marco encontramos una organización relativamente nueva, fruto ya del sistema internacional de post-guerra fría que es la OCS. Liderada por China (mas Rusia) con países asiáticos y para la seguridad asiática. Ya se que la OCS no és una alianza militar, y por esto no debemos contemplarla como la OTAN de China, es mas, la OCS se adapta mejor a la situación actual de la región. India (con un low profile), Pakistan, Iran son observadores, pero se ha negado la participación a EEUU y a otros. Asi, me parece que, más que aumentar el espacio operativo de la OTAN hacia Asia (los Europeos no creo que queramos esto) y mejor que crear una OTAN asiática, sería más interesante crear una OCS americana o india para Asia.

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GPS, Galileo, Beidou 2 y Glonass

Estos son los nombres de 4 proyectos que tendrán exactamente la misma función pero que estarán bajo diferente control: EEUU, UE, China y Rusia.
Todos ellos tienen claras aplicaciones civiles, muy útiles, y que bien conocemos en el caso del GPS, que es el único que ya funciona, y es un claro ejemplo de negocio económico de beneficios de escala y un monopolio natural. Esto es, porque realizar 4 redes de satélites mundiales que hagan lo mismo? La única respuesta possible es las implicaciones de seguridad. Si EEUU estubiera de acuerdo en ceder el mando y control del GPS a estas naciones, seguro que no tendrían porque desarollarlo, pero EEUU perdería el monopolio que tiene ahora.
Hasta el momento China se había sumado al proyecto europeo, pero ahora parece que va a desarrollar el suyo propio, igual que Rusia.
Esto me parece una excelente muestra de la creciente multipolaridad mundial.

Más información en este interesante artículo de Japan Focus.

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EU and China: Taiwan and the IMF

Two interesting points. The first one from Raghuram Rajan, in the Financial Times asks why China and India are keeping silent about the EU unilateral appointment of a new chief of the IMF:

This brings us to why China and India are so silent. I would conjecture that they have little faith that the system can be changed or produce outcomes they can buy into. Why give the process more legitimacy by making noises about the selection of the managing director, noises that will only lead the EU to “consult” widely about the choice they have already made? Far better to keep quiet now, and allow the EU to dig a deeper grave for the multilateral financial system.

The second one, from the Economist, asks another interesting question: why the EU is not backing Taiwan’s referendum asking voters whether they would like the island to seek membership of the United Nations under its historic name, the “Republic of China”, or just “Taiwan”?

Portugal, which took over the six-month rotating presidency of the EU this month, has duly drafted a private warning to Taiwan, saying that a referendum risks raising tensions and would be “unhelpful”. A parallel message is to be sent to China, urging restraint.
UN membership for Taiwan is a long-lost cause, and Mr Chen’s referendum plan is at heart an electoral ploy ahead of next year’s presidential poll. But that is the sort of thing that happens in a democracy. One dissenting EU diplomat says the Union is pretending there is “moral equivalence” between Taiwanese election politics and Chinese threats of violence. Certainly, this is not how most people understand the EU‘s oft-professed values.

Both articles show opposite tendencies. The first one shows the EU as still not caring much about the power of China and India in the financial arena, but that both are going to keep silent bc they really want to desligitimize the whole organization. So they are revisionist states waiting for the current international institutions to collapse.
The second one, shows a big concern of the EU authorities for the China reaction over the Taiwan issue on the UN. So here, China is an status quo power that doesn’t really want any change on the UN.

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EU, Central Asia and Energy diversification

Otro interesante informe del International Crisis Group, recién salido del horno, uno de los elementos más destacables es el mapa del final, que puede ser de gran utilidad por su claridad:

Bishkek/Brussels, 24 May 2007: Central Asia’s oil and gas cannot solve the European Union’s energy dependence on Russia, but these resources can destabilise the producing region unless governments use the revenues to promote good governance and rule of law.

Central Asia’s Energy Risks,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the resources of three countries – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – and the dangers of mishandling them. It argues that a trans-Caspian gas pipeline cannot largely write Russia out of the European energy equation, as Brussels hopes. But it also disputes the common view that the 12 May Russian-Central Asian gas agreement prevents that pipeline from being built.

“Central Asia can make a contribution – a modest one – to helping resolve Europe’s energy security concerns”, says Charles Esser, Crisis Group Energy Analyst, “but only if outside investment is tied to the good governance that is needed to improve regional and human security. If Western governments turn their eyes away from mismanagement and human rights abuses in expectation of short-term gains, they risk stimulating instability in Central Asia that will only add to their energy and other security problems”.

The three countries present different challenges, but all three are suffering from the “resource curse”. Kazakhstan has used its money best and is impressive compared to its neighbours but should aim for a higher standard now. It is at a point where enormous oil revenues need to be translated into commensurate outcomes that benefit its citizens. Corruption, an undiversified economy, improper management of state funds and a lack of the legal guarantees that are part of a true democracy hold it back.

All these problems are more extreme in Turkmenistan, a major gas exporter that was pillaged by the eccentric and brutal dictator Saparmurat Niyazov until his death in December 2006. Despite a relatively high per capita income on paper, most Turkmen live in poverty. Investment in energy production has faltered. It remains to be seen if anything fundamental will change under the new leader, a close protégé of Niyazov’s who came to power in a rigged election. He may not have much time before revenues fall, as gas production will decline without substantial new investment.

Uzbekistan has the least oil and gas of the three producers. It is a net importer of oil, and much of its declining gas output has been sold to Russia. Despite wishful thinking in some European capitals, it will never be a part of EU energy security arrangements. The gas also perpetuates a system that impoverishes and represses its people. Domestic supplies are often cut in winter, for example, so the gas can be sold abroad, leaving cities unheated in freezing weather, provoking protests and serious unrest.

“The hard fact is there is no substitute for arrangements with Russia that stress mutual dependence on commercial oil and gas delivery”, says Michael Hall, Crisis Group Central Asia Project Director. “The international community needs to pay more attention to Central Asia as a security risk, without expecting it to solve its outside energy needs”.

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Countries have agreed to create a 7,500 km ring road around the Black Sea.

Thursday, 19 April 2007
Economic cooperation is the main objective, but the road could bring much needed tourists – and their money – to new areas of Eurasia.

The foreign ministers of Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova and Serbia all agreed to the project at a conference of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organisation.

Existing roads will be upgraded and linked up under the project Caravan Route.

“…From Beijing to Brussels”

12 trucks, one from each country, were sent to test the current state of roads and make recommendations.’

Road construction and rehabilitation is vital to build ties among the EU, Black Sea and Asian countries,’ a BSEC statement read.’The road is of extreme importance. It would facilitate economic cooperation and conflict resolution,’ BSEC secretary general Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos added.

The route would travel through some hot spots including areas like Armenia, Turkey, and Georgia.

The cost of the project and date of completion were not set.

The BSEC represents a region with the second largest source of oil and natural gas and annual foreign trade of over €220bn.

This would a new step towards the buiding of the New Silk Road, agreed in Shanghai in 2004 and that could be really significant for the Centran Asian Countries:

“For landlocked countries, the highway portends a revival of the cross-continent access that the legendary Silk Route provided in the early part of the first millennium,” UNESCAP said in a press release.

Big nations like Japan, China, South Korea, Russia and India would also benefit from the better trade links, it added.”

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The Politics of Imagining Asia: Empires, Nations, Regional and Global Orders

Excellent article written by Prof. Wang Hui, and published in Japan Focus

Abstract

Following the recent trends of globalization and regionalization, the idea of Asia has been revived in political, economic, and cultural fields. This essay examines some of the multiple uses of the idea of Asia in modern East Asian and especially Chinese history. It consists of four parts. Part One discusses how the idea of Asia developed from modern European history, especially the nineteenth century European narrative of “World History,” and points out how the early modern Japanese “theory of shedding Asia” derived from this narrative. Part Two studies the relationship between the idea of Asia and two forms of Narodism against the background of the Chinese and Russian revolutions. One, exemplified by Russian Narodism, attempted to use Asian particularity to challenge modern capitalism; the other, represented by Sun Yat-sen, attempted to construct a nation-state on the basis of a socialist revolutionary program, and to develop agricultural capitalism under the particular social conditions of Asia. Part Three considers the differences and tensions between the “Great Asianism” of Chinese revolutionaries such as Sun and the Japanese idea of Toyo (East Asia), and discusses the need to overcome the categories of nation-state and international relations in order to understand the question of Asia. Part Four discusses the need to go beyond early modern maritime-centered accounts, nationalist frameworks, and Eurocentrism in reexamining the question of Asia through historical research by focusing on the particular legacies of Asia (such as the tributary system) and the problems of “early modernity.”

Read it here

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Nato-ise the ABM

The deployment of just a dozen defensive missiles and a radar in Poland and Czech Republic to improve and enlarge the US shield to the east has generated a big controversy in Eastern Europe.
First bc Romania and Bulgaria were not included, second bc even if the US excuse is Iran, the Russians have felt threatened and third, and most interesting, bc of the split of the European reaction.

51% of the Polish said they didn’t want the missiles and only34 % of czechs think that the radar is a good idea, both are very antlantists. At the same time, France has not opposed the deployment while Merkel asks to Nato-ise (“otanizar”) the issue.

The article is from The Economist, “ A few interceptors, a big gap,” Mar 29th 2007 but I found it translated in the Economist China Organization, here I paste the best part of it.

Chancellor Angela Merkel, a Christian Democrat whose instincts are more Atlanticist than those of her coalition partners, has signalled through a spokesman that she wants to “NATO-ise” the issue of new missile defences.
作为对一起虚伪的争吵的恰当的回应，德国政治大师们也许已经发明了一种造作的解决方案——至少对于德国国内的困境而言是这样。一个比她的同盟伙伴有着更多大西洋主义者本能的基督教民主党人，司法官Angela Merkel通过发言人表示，她希望关于新导弹防御系统的争论能够“北约化”。

What does that mean?<Not much, in practice—but this ugly word reflects the political fact that to some European ears, the common deliberations, and ultimately common decisions, of NATO have a slightly softer, fuzzier sound than anything done unilaterally by the United States. NATO, after all, is a partnership in which all members, at least formally, have a say.
这是什么意思？没有多少现实意义，但是这句不愉快的话反映了一个政治现实——比起美国的单边主义作法，北约国家的普遍讨论以及最终的普遍决议在一些欧洲人听来稍微更加柔软和模糊（不那么刺耳）。北大西洋公约组织毕竟是伙伴关系，所有成员至少在形式上要统一口径。

Others are now jumping aboard the “NATO-ising” bandwagon, including politicians in the Czech Republic, where a poll showed just 31% of voters in favour of the shield. According to the foreign minister, Karel Schwarzenberg, many Czech legislators would find it much easier to support the installation if “it could be included somehow in the NATO system”.
其他人正在加入北约化浪潮，包括捷克政治家——民意测验显示，只有31%的捷克选民对导弹防御系统感兴趣。按照外交部长卡雷尔施瓦曾伯格的说法，如果“捷克以某种方式被纳入北约体系”，许多议员会更容易支持部署（防御系统）。

In hard military reality, the new system cannot be included. The radars and interceptors will be built by America, and controlled by America, and deployed by bilateral agreement with the hosts. If people hope for a non-American, or NATO, finger on interceptor buttons, they will be let down. In Berlin earlier this month, General Obering was asked whether his system should be brought into NATO.<“I believe this system would complement NATO very nicely,” he replied carefully.
严格意义的军事实物不能包括新系统。雷达和拦截系统将会由美国建造，美国控制，并且按照与东道主签订的双边协议部署。如果人们希望放在拦截器按钮上的手指不是美国的，也不是北约的，他们将会失望。这个月早些时候，Obering将军在柏林被问及该系统是否应被纳入北约范围。“我相信系统将非常好地给北约提供补充。”他慎重地回答。

As it happens, NATO has for years been preparing for the more limited option of a theatre missile defence, which could indeed be jointly procured and managed by the alliance. But strategic interceptors, albeit few in number, are another matter: the Pentagon won’t share the keys with anyone.<This week, a Pentagon official stated, at a congressional hearing, that the need for unanimous decision-making in NATO made it the wrong place to decide how missile defences should be deployed.
>就 是这样，北约已经为战区导弹防御系统这一更为有限的选择准备了好多年，这个系统可以真正的实现连接并被盟国掌握。但是战略拦截器，虽然数量不多却是另外一 回事：五角大楼不愿与任何人分享关键部分。本周，一位五角大楼官员在国会听证会上表示，对于怎样部署导弹防御系统，北约盟国认为需要形成一致的决议是错误 的立场。

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NATO and EU. The chinese wiew.

In Peoples Daily there is an interesting interview with three promminent chinese academics: Yang Yu, director of the EU Affairs Office of elite Nanjing University in east China’s Jiangsu Province, Prof. Wu Yikang with the World Economy Institute of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and Shen Jiru, a researcher of the Institute of World Economies and Politics under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

The main aim of the interview is to try to understand why NATO and EU are so different (if they are) but they have almost the same membership. And then, to figure out if the EU is becoming more independent from NATO and the US.

All three seem quite pessimistic about Europe’s power and sees Russia as a threat but also as a partner of Europe, while the US still sees Russia mainly as an enemy. The increasing European dependence on Russian energy can have and impact on the US/EU relations.

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