Cuando aún estamos analizando las reformas constitucionales de Kirgyizistan hemos visto el intento turco de crear una Comonwealth de países de habla turca. En la reunión asistieron Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan y Turquia y además de buenas intenciones en temas culturales, económicos, etc… la reunión tuvo un interesante apunte de seguridad. Así se llegaron a declarar:
We declare that we support peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in accordance with the principle of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and that we will further support fraternal Azerbaijan in this dispute,”
“increasing importance of the Caspian Basin for the energy security of Europe” and the “strategic importance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan [BTC] oil pipeline opening and the [expected] completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum [BTE] natural gas pipeline.” They also stressed the importance of the possible addition of trans-Caspian transportation routes to both the BTC and the BTE.
Kazakshtani President Nursultan Nazarbayev took observers, and even many participants, by surprise by proposing the creation of a Turkic parliamentary assembly. Nazarbayev went on to nominate former Turkish president and prime minister Suleyman Demirel to serve as the proposed assembly’s first chairman.
If the Turkic states actually opted to coordinate diplomatic action, they might have the collective muscle to alter the existing equilibrium in many geopolitical matters. In the case of Turkey’s troubled drive to join the EU, for example, a Turkic commonwealth could influence Brussels’ decision-making calculus by playing the energy card, letting it be known that a rebuff of Ankara could hinder the EU’s access to Central Asian energy supplies.
Pero, cómo dsetaca IWPR:
Although a proposal to establish an economic and energy union was floated at the recent summit of Turkic states, NBCentralAsia analysts say it is unlikely such a grouping could be founded merely on the basis of linguistic similarities. A cultural and political grouping of Turkic countries seems a more realistic prospect.
Pero ya tenemos el problema de Uzbekistán, una vez más, central para cualquier OIG regional.
Beyond the steps toward closer cooperation, the Turkic summit will be remembered for the public airing of a diplomatic feud between Turkey and Uzbekistan. Some news reports claimed that Uzbek officials stayed away from the gathering to protest the final declaration’s wording on the Karabakh settlement. However, a senior Turkish official said the reason for Tashkent’s displeasure was Turkey’s decision to join the United States in supporting a draft measure in UN General Assembly’s Human Rights Council that would condemn human rights violations in Uzbekistan.
The official was outspoken in his criticism of both Uzbekistan’s rights behavior and Tashkent’s reaction to Ankara’s vote. “It is time that some countries learned that democracy and human rights are essential to integrate into the global system,” he said. “Turkey will persistently work to promote democracy and human rights for the region`s own benefit.”
Turkey’s decision to vote for the draft Human Rights Council resolution was “a reflection of our ideals and understanding of the importance of democracy and respect for human rights,” the official continued. “Turkey has been criticized for similar reasons [human rights violations] in the past, but we never turned it into a bilateral issue, and chose to make improvemenst in our [democracy and human right] records instead.”
Such blunt talk would appear to mark a significant shift in Turkish policy, as Turkish officials had unitl now avoided open criticism of Uzbek government action. It may be that Turkey’s desire to meet EU accession criteria, especially the need to bolster its human rights credentials, is playing a role in the adoption of a toughter line toward Tashkent. The official also indicated that Ankara is growing tired of Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s demands. “They [Uzbek officials] also accuse us of supporting the Uzbek opposition, citing [the fact that] opposition leader Mohammad Solih freely travels to and lives in Turkey. Mr. Solih is free to travel anywhere he wants to go, and travels to Norway, Britain and the United States. Why is Turkey being singled out?” the official said.
Pero Uzbekistán se está replanteando volver a la CSTO (Interfax):
TASHKENT. Nov 22 (Interfax) – The lower house of Uzbekistan’s parliament has ratified the Protocol on the restoration of the country’s membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the parliament’s press service told Interfax.
Y otros problemas sociales entre kazajos y turcos (Eurasianet):
The rioting October 20-21 reportedly was sparked by an incident in which Turkish workers at a construction site at the Tengiz oilfield – one of the largest in the world – accused a Kazakhstani colleague of trying to cut into the lunch line. Nasty words gave way to fisticuffs, and the situation rapidly spun out of control as other workers joined in the mayhem. The ensuing brawl involved roughly 400 workers.
“We have become slaves on our land,” said one. “We do what the Turks say, but you can’t please them. They constantly threaten to fire us. If you are three minutes late, you lose your job.” “We work better and they earn more,” added another.
Finalmente, un buen análisis clánico de las protestas en Kirguizistan, en Eurasianet:
The protest participants represented all generations and most social groups, although unemployed men in their thirties and forties were most conspicuous. There were certainly genuine supporters of democratic reform found in the protester ranks, but the majority of demonstrators were tied to influential opposition leaders through extensive kinship and/or regional networks, known in Russian by the term zemlyachestvo.
For example, Azimbek Beknazarov, a member of parliament, brought in busloads of supporters from the Aksy region, his home region and the site of the 2002 confrontation between government troops. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Former parliament speaker Tekebayev’s supporters came from his constituency in Bazarkorgon and Jalal-Abad, in southern Kyrgyzstan. Tekebayev also relied on his personal ties with influential MPs and former officials to bolster support for the For Reforms coalition.
Melis Eshimkanov, an opposition MP who owns the Agym newspaper was instrumental in mobilizing rural dwellers as well as his supporters from Naryn province.
Most importantly, the opposition coalition received strong financial backing from several prominent entrepreneurs, including Almazbek Atambayev, Omurbek Babanov and Temir Sariyev. In addition, these wealthy oligarchs mobilized supporters from their home towns in the North, employees of their vast holdings, their relatives and friends.
The logistical capabilities demonstrated by the opposition sharply contrasted with those exhibited by Bakiyev and his supporters. The president, like his political opponents, attempted to tap into kinship and patronage networks. Only Bakiyev’s networks proved far less organized than the opposition’s.
There are good and bad lessons to be learned from the constitutional crisis and its outcome. On the positive side, the events of early November in Bishkek showed that a well-organized and peaceful protest movement in Central Asia can accomplish desired change. It’s especially noteworthy that the For Reforms movement proved capable of bridging regional divisions in pursuit of a common goal. The movement’s success could prompt political elites in other Central Asian nations to develop similar vertical and horizontal networks to challenge authoritarianism.
The potential negative consequence is that the November events could accelerate the trend known as “hyper-democracy,” in which self-interested wealthy actors rely on mass mobilization to promote their own narrow political and economic interests.