Monthly Archives: November 2006

Maquillaje constitucional para Asia Central

Kulov concluded, “There’s no crisis in this country – the crisis is within parliament itself.”

Ya vimos la nueva constitución de Kirguizistán y sus principales nuevas características, el giro hacia el parlamentarismo con la reducción del poder del presidente. Sen embargo debemos destacar que la nueva constitución no se estableció siguiendo la legalidad sino que con la presión de las manifiestaciones y con la creación por parte de la oposición de órganos ad hoc como la cmisión constityuente, que no eran contemplados por el marco legal (cómo destacaron Kulov y Bakayev).
Sin embargo, el presidente mantiene algunos poderes importantes:

The president will see his powers curtailed, though perhaps not as much as the opposition hoped. Any political party that wins more than 50 per cent of the vote can automatically form a government, but if no party gets such a majority, the president will name a cabinet as he does now.

The changes demanded by Bakiev before he signed his name to the constitution included a provision that impeachment proceedings against him require a three-quarters majority in parliament, instead of just two-thirds as had been envisaged. He also gets to approve the cabinet line-up, appoint local judges, and name the head of the Central Electoral Committee, the chairman of the National Bank and the prosecutor general without referring to other authority.

In line with the opposition’s wish for a stronger parliament, the Jogorku Kenesh will be expanded from its present 75 seats to 90 – still short of the 105 that Bakiev reportedly agreed to on October 31. All members are currently elected by the first-past-the-post system; the constitution now allows half of the 90 deputies to be drawn from political party lists under a proportional representation system, although the opposition had hoped a majority would be selected that way to help rule out gerrymandering by unscrupulous governments.

Por su parte en Kazakhstan se está plantendo también cambiar de sistema político e incluso cambiar de alfabeto, a pesar de los costes de la medida y de que genera problemas inter-gneracionales. Y también Karmiov, en Uzbekistán está planteando un proceso de “maquillaje constitucional”.
La reforma constitucional no es una novedad en la región, pero si lo es la dirección que parece pueden tomar estas reformas. Tras 15 año de profundización del presidencialismo autoritario, el parlamentarismo aparece ahora como una nueva tendencia.

En una entrevista de Ferghana. ru. al gobernador de Chuisk (que fué obligado a dimitir por Bakayev tras los hechos) nos relata los intresijos de este noviembre caliente en Kirguizistan:

Tursunbek Kulmurzayev: What transpired in Bishkek became a continuation of the March 2005 revolution. It was not a counter-revolution. Elected the president, Bakiyev promised no delays with the constitutional reforms. It was eighteen months ago. This year, we reminded him of his promises at least twice. When the second rally was under way, its participants demanded the reforms and spoke in defense of Prime Minister Felix Kulov who had been threatened by the late kingpin Rysbek Akmatbayev. It was on May 27, 2006. Leaders of the Movement For The Reforms demanded from Bakiyev amendment of the Constitution. The president gave his word that the matter would be brought to the attention of the Jogorku Kenesh, the parliament, when it returned from the summer vacation, i.e. on September 1. September passed with nothing to show for it, October followed.

Ferghana.Ru: Amendments to the Constitution restrict presidential powers. Even the National Security Service (the former KGB) is to be answerable to the parliament now. All other personnel issues are to be handled by the prime minister. And what does it leave the president with?

Tursunbek Kulmurzayev: The opposition defeated the president. The draft Constitution agreed upon at the negotiations between the authorities and the opposition divided the powers between the president and the parliament evenly, fifty-fifty. When Bakiyev cheated, however, it changed everything, and the amendments to the Constitution altered the ratio of powers to 20 to 80. As of now, the president (with the Jogorku Kenesh’s approval) will only appoint and fire prosecutor general, National Bank chairman, Auditing Commission chairman, and Central Election Commission chairman. All other staff issues are to be handled by the prime minister, and that includes appointment of district akims and regional governors, ministers, and directors of state agencies. The president of Kyrgyzstan is like the Her Majesty the Queen in Great Britain now. I’m not here to pin the blame for this state of affairs on him or his inner circle. Bakiyev only had to forward to the parliament the draft Constitution agreed upon with the opposition, and everything would have been all right. The Constitution we now have, however, proclaims Kyrgyzstan a parliamentary republic. The Jogorku Kenesh alone wields the power to hire and fire prime minister. Neither can the president lord it over lawmakers. He is only supposed to bow to their will and accept the prime minister they have selected. The premier in his turn will appoint governors and they – akims.

Ferghana.Ru: Do you know your successor? Who is to be put in your place?

Tursunbek Kulmurzayev: On November 7, the presidential administration pondered the idea of appointing Jalbak Kazakbai, ex-director of an ore mining and processing enterprise. Even the decree appointing him was drafted but the president knew better than sign it. Wise of him. It turned out that this Kazakbai had spent nine years behind the bars. He was pardoned by Akayev’s regime. It was Felix Kulov who suggested Kazakbai, his fellow inmate. They had shared one and same cell once.

Ferghana.Ru: A few words about Kulov then. So far as I know, you were one of the authors of the whole idea to establish the tandem of Bakiyev and Kulov…

Tursunbek Kulmurzayev: It was Atambayev and yours truly who established this tandem. Now that I’m thoroughly disappointed in it and its performance, however, I feel free to open some cards and expose some of the White House intrigues.

When we were elevated to the corridors of power in the March Revolution last year, Kulov was in charge of law enforcement agencies and I was the National Security Service coordinator. Bakiyev was the prime minister prior to becoming acting president. It is common knowledge that all these changes notwithstanding, certain tension in the relations between south and north never abated. Trying to minimize it, we decided to make Kulov senior deputy premier. Since his release from jail hadn’t been exactly legitimate, however, we decided to observe all formalities first. (Kulov had been released on revolutionaries’ demands.) His case was forwarded to the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan on the initiative of the Prosecutor General’s Office. The Supreme Court cleared his name last April and thus rehabilitated Kulov in the eyes of the people.

Presidential election was to take place in Kyrgyzstan on June 10, and Kulov was running for president. We wanted to nominate Atambayev but he declined the honor and said that the situation being what it was, we’d better support Bakiyev. There was a problem even with that, however, because Kulov was from the north and Bakiyev from the south.

That’s when it occurred to Atambayev and me that these two leaders should form a tandem. Atambayev talked to Kulov and I with Bakiyev. I told Bakiyev that we could make him the president but only if he gave his word to make Kulov the prime minister. Bakiyev agreed. Persuading Kulov took considerably longer because he kept refusing. The talked lasted a week. We told Kulov that he didn’t stand a chance because he didn’t speak Kyrgyz.

Cholpon Bayekova of the Constitutional Court was of great help to us then. She put all Bakiyev-Kulov accords on paper to preclude future misunderstanding. I showed the document to Bakiyev and Kulov several times because they wanted some things amended and corrected. Shortly speaking, we all went to Bakiyev on May 12, 2005. He was not alone. His advisors Danijar Usenov, Modumarov, Arynbayev, and Isabekov were present too. “I believe we agreed that nobody else was to be involved,” I said. “This is something to be decided by the four of us – you, me, Kulov, and Atambayev. Kulov and you sign the document in our presence and we go public.”
The newly adopted law permits the president to perform his duties pending expiration of his tenure in 2010. If the parliament elects a normal prime minister who chooses professionals for the government, if positive political and economic changes take place, then I suspect that the people will let Bakiyev alone for the remaining 3.5 years. If, however, Bakiyev begins his games all over again, if decisions are made in the matter they have been made so far, then the Kyrgyzes will demand his early resignation.

Ferghana.Ru: Are you saying that another revolution may take place?

Tursunbek Kulmurzayev: It is a possibility.

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New kazak anthem by Borat

En Borat ha arribat a Catalunya, i per la porta gran. No només s’estrena la peli la setmana que ve sinó que ahir TV3 va començar a emetre els episodis de Borat en el progra d’Ali G Show. Fa un temps ja vam parlar d’ell en aquest blog però ara vuill destcar el nou himne de Kazakhstan… no té pèrdua! Jo casi que ja me’l ser de memòria.

També hem de destacar que Borat ja té el seu propi blog de fans en castellà:


And remember:

MY MOVIEFILM NOW PLAYS IN MOVIE THEATERS
YOU GO LOOK ON IT – IF IT NOT SUCCESS I BE EXECUTE!!!

Desplaçats interns


Us penjo un recurs prou bo, relacionat amb els Desplaçats interns.

Bona col·lecció de mapes.

Enllaç a la web

Bangladesh en caos

Bangladesh sigue de manifestaciones y atentados políticos. La violencia se expande, se incendian trenes y autobuses, bloquen los puertos del país… la capital esta casi incomunicada y el ejercito ha salido a la calle para intentar mantener el orden. La controversia que ha generado la actual situación de caos enfrenta a los dos principales partidos sobre la composición de la Comisión Electoral que debe supervisar las elecciones de enero. Una vez más, la democracia está en peligro en el país. ¿Pero porque? DNA India dice:

To veteran Bangladesh watchers, there is nothing surprising about these developments. The battle between the two political parties has been the bane of democracy in Bangladesh. But time and again, this polarisation has led to an impasse in the country. (…)

Parece pues que ¿el problema es institucional? ¿Puede ser Bangladesh un nuevo estado fracasado? Justamente cuando la económia empieza a florecer…

El executive summary del informe Bangladesh Today del International Crisis Group explica muy bien las causas profundas que han llevado a la situación actual.

La UE mantiene las sanciones a Uzbekistán

Tras días de incertidumbre y rumores sobre el posible levantamiento de las sanciones que la UE impuso a Uzbekistán tras la masacre de Andijan en 2005 finalmente, y con gran sorpresa, ha decidido mantenerlas.

Parecía, que la nueva aproximación de realpolitk de la UE hacia el Este (como vimos en la cumbre informal con Rusia, etc.) provocaría una relajación de las sanciones. La UE buscaba una excusa para levantarlas sin perder la cara, Uzbekistán accedía a establecer un diálogo sobre derechos humanos, pero la presión de ONGs y la soberbia alemana han cambiado la situación.

El papel de Alemania ha sido crucial. Sin duda es el país europeo con más intereses en el país entre los que destacan la base militar de Termez y el consumo de gas mientras que el gobierno uzbeco permite a las ONGs alemanas actuar en el país. En cambio, ha prohibido la actuación de la mayoría de ONGs norteamericanas y ha cerrado su base militar.

Pero la insistencia alemana y su falta de respeto a las sanciones impuestas por la UE (permitió la visita de altos cargos uzbecos) le ha pasado factura. Igual que la misión de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Bundestag que el mes pasado concluyó que Uzbekistán no había realizado progresos en esta materia. Así, el Consejo de Europa ha aprobado mantener las sanciones se mantienen por otros seis meses: el embargo armamentístico, la prohibición de viajar a Europa de altos cargos uzbecos, etc. (ver documento aprobado)

Considering the lack of progress with regard to the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, the Council decided to extend the arms embargo and visa restrictions imposed in connection with the Andijan events. It decided to reinstate technical meetings with Uzbekistan with the aim of bringing about improvements in the human rights situation.


(ver texto aprobado Parlamento Europeo 26 octubre y muy interesante leer el debate del 26 de octubre).

Sin duda esto nos recuerda la situación sobre el embargo armamentístico de la UE a China. Andijan es el Tinanmen uzbeco (no perderse el informe de Akiner que ha traído tanta polémica en la blogosfera), ninguno de los dos se ha respetado completamente por los países de la UE, ahora los intereses económicos cuestionana las sanciones, pero el lobby derechos humanos continúa siendo fuerte. A principios de 2005 parecía también que se levantaría el embargo armamentístico. La reacción de EEUU y de algunos parlamentarios europeos (destacamos el ya mítico Rueda Report,) paró el proceso.

Durex World

Deixo l’enllaç a l’informe d’una gran enquesta que porta a terme anualment l’empresa DUREX, i que fa referència als habits sexuals de més de 317.000 persones, de 41 països. Més enllà de qui, com i quan es fan les suggerents preguntes, l’informe ofereix un ample panorama, força curiós.

Com no podia ser d’altra manera tractant-se d’una empresa d’anticoncepetius, cal prendre precaucions abans de llegir l’enquesta!! sobretot, si no se’n coneix l’historial !

Poc més enllà de l’anècdota, però deixa resultats interessants pels països asiàtics, i pels mediterranis, que mantenim la fama de ser els més ‘sensuals’, o el més mentiders. 😉

Enllaç a l’enquesta

Nou lllibre del Fred Halliday

Surt en el marc d’una col·lecció especialitzada en relacions internacionals de l’Editorial Catarata.
Enllaç al catàleg
La obra de Halliday es un intento de respuesta a la combinación de turbulencia política y confusión teórica que viven en estos momentos las Relaciones Internacionales. El planteamiento novedoso estriba en tratar de abrir una nueva vía teórica de las Relaciones Internacionales y sugiere un plan para su estudio basado en una mayor presencia de conceptos que hasta ahora han tenido un lugar secundario o marginal en la disciplina y en una orientación metodológica que evite el culto a la cuantificación, la predicción y la cientificidad.
Entre esos conceptos que reclama como indispensables para una educada comprensión y explicación de las Relaciones Internacionales, se encuentran la ética como criterio inspirador, el materialismo histórico liberado del dogmatismo y la conformidad, el reconocimiento del papel clave de la historia, la adopción de un enfoque sociológico para el estudio tanto de la sociedad internacional como del Estado, la introducción del enfoque de género, la importancia de la consideración de los factores socio-económicos e ideológicos, y la necesidad de entender a lo “interno” para entender lo “internacional”.
La obra, sin embargo, no es sólo una argumentación sólida a favor de un nuevo enfoque teórico, sino que además lo aplica tratando de explicar las profundas transformaciones experimentadas por la sociedad internacional a raíz del final de la guerra fría analizando toda una serie de cuestiones y problemas fundamentales, como por ejemplo, el “fin de la historia”, el papel del Estado y las profundas transformaciones experimentadas por la sociedad internacional a la luz del concepto de “homogeneidad, que puede servir para explicar los efectos de la globalización, la extensión de la democracia y el derrumbamiento de la Unión soviética.
Fred Halliday, autor de un gran número de libros sobre política internacional y sobre la situación de Oriente Próximo, es profesor de Relaciones Internacionales de la London School of Economics y editorialista de New Left Review y de Middle East Research and Information Project.