Drezner’s interesting article says that European countries are the ones to blame in order to adapt the current international institutions (IMF, UN,G-7, etc.) to the emerging powers like China and India. It may have some good points, but it looks like it forgets thats is Washington who has the current monopoly on them, so it’s the US ready to loose its monopoly? Drezner is looking for a new concert of great powers… to substitute the old one… but there is no old concert of powers but a US hegemony (the last was the European concert of powers). The UNSC, IMF, WTO are not concerts of power, but multilateral organizations that are controled by Washington (not by and “old concert of powers”), so the US is the one to lose more weight (not Europe).
Adapting these regimes to the new power distribution is not changing them? With new, values, new norms, etc.? What about NATO? Finally, is not only Europe and the US, China is not willing to get India or Japan in to the UNSC either for exemple.
Some excerpts from this worth reading article:
The New New World Order by Daniel W. Drezner From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007
Throughout the twentieth century, the list of the world’s great powers was predictably short: the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and northwestern Europe. The twenty-first century will be different. China and India are emerging as economic and political heavyweights.
This tectonic shift will pose a challenge to the U.S.-dominated global institutions that have been in place since the 1940s.But unless rising powers such as China and India are incorporated into this framework, the future of these international regimes will be uncomfortably uncertain.
To be sure, the EU has made its own bilateral accommodations and has been happy to cooperate with emerging countries in response to American unilateralism. But European states have been less willing to reduce their overrepresentation in multilateral institutions. The second problem, which is of the Bush administration’s own making, stems from Washington’s reputation for unilateralism.
Today, the distribution of power in the world is very different. According to Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, by 2010, the annual growth in combined national income from Brazil, Russia, India, and China — the so-called BRIC countries — will be greater than that from the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy combined; by 2025, it will be twice that of the G-7 (the group of highly industrialized countries).
Global institutions cease to be appropriate when the allocation of decision-making authority within them no longer corresponds to the distribution of power — and that is precisely the situation today. The UN Security Council is one obvious example; the G-7 is an even more egregious one.
“In the twenty-first century, emerging nations like India and China and Brazil and Egypt and Indonesia and South Africa are increasingly shaping the course of history. … Our current global posture does not really reflect that fact. For instance, we have nearly the same number of State Department personnel in Germany, a country of 82 million people, that we have in India, a country of one billion people. It is clear today that America must begin to reposition our diplomatic forces around the world … to new critical posts for the twenty-first century.” Rice announced that a hundred State Department employees would be moved from Europe to countries such as India and China by 2007.
Power is a zero-sum game, and so any attempt to boost the standing of China, India, and other rising states within international organizations will cost other countries some of their influence in those forums. These prospective losers can be expected to stall or sabotage attempts at reform. Although European countries are still significant, their economic and demographic growth does not match that of either the emerging powers or the United States. Having been endowed with privileged positions in many key postwar institutions, European countries stand to lose the most in a redistribution of power favoring countries on the Pacific Rim. And since they effectively hold vetoes in many organizations, they can resist U.S.-led changes. The Europeans argue that they still count thanks to the EU, which lets them command a 25-member voting bloc in many institutions. But if the EU moves toward a common policy on foreign affairs and security, it will be worth asking why Brussels deserves 25 voices when the 50 states comprising the United States get only one.
The United States faces a challenging road ahead. European countries remain vital allies. On issues such as human rights and democracy promotion, Europe speaks with a powerful, constructive voice. Bringing China and India into the concert of great powers without alienating the EU or its members will require prodigious amounts of diplomatic will and skill. The Bush administration has gotten off to a solid start. As it proceeds, its task is simple to articulate but hard to execute: keep the United States’ old friends close and its new friends closer.