Hoy incluso algunos periódicos españoles como El País destacan un pedazo de las conversaciones de Kissinger en China descalificadas recientemente por el Departamento de Estado norteamericano, y especialmente en la parte en que Mao hace referencia a la supuesta entrega de 10 millones de chinas a EEUU, sin duda una broma machista (que no marxista), de mal gusto, pero que puede entenderse especialmente si contextualizamos el momento histórico, leemos el contexto de relajación en la conversación y suponemos (como podemos intuir) la presencia de dos bellas traductoras durante la conversación con las que Mao flirtea. Aquí va el extracto del texto original pero no dudéis en leer todas las transcripciones, que son apasionantes:
Chairman Mao: The trade between our two countries at present is
very pitiful. It is gradually increasing. You know China is a very poor
country. We don’t have much. What we have in excess is women.
Dr. Kissinger: There are no quotas for those or tariffs.
Chairman Mao: So if you want them we can give a few of those
to you, some tens of thousands. (Laughter)
Prime Minister Chou: Of course, on a voluntary basis.
Chairmain Mao: Let them go to your place. They will create disasters.
That way you can lessen our burdens. (Laughter)
Chairman Mao: Do you want our Chinese women? We can give
you ten million. (Laughter, particularly among the women.)
Dr. Kissinger: The Chairman is improving his offer.
Chairman Mao: By doing so we can let them flood your country
with disaster and therefore impair your interests. In our country we
have too many women, and they have a way of doing things. They
give birth to children and our children are too many. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: It is such a novel proposition, we will have to
Chairman Mao: You can set up a committee to study the issue.
That is how your visit to China is settling the population question.
Dr. Kissinger: We will study utilization and allocation.
Chairman Mao: If we ask them to go I think they would be willing.
Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily.
Chairman Mao: That’s because of their feudal ideas, big nation
Dr. Kissinger: We are certainly willing to receive them.
Chairman Mao: The Chinese are very alien-excluding.
For instance, in your country you can let in so many nationalities,
yet in China how many foreigners do you see?
Prime Minister Chou: Very few.
Dr. Kissinger: Very few.
Chairman Mao: You have about 600,000 Chinese in the United
States. We probably don’t even have 60 Americans here. I would like
to study the problem. I don’t know the reason.
Miss Tang: Mr. Lord’s wife is Chinese.
Chairman Mao: Oh?
Mr. Lord: Yes.
Chairman Mao: I studied the problem. I don’t know why the Chinese
never like foreigners. There are no Indians perhaps. As for the
Japanese, they are not very numerous either; compared to others there
are quite a few and some are married and settled down.
Dr. Kissinger: Of course, your experience with foreigners has not
been all that fortunate.
Chairman Mao: Yes, perhaps that is some reason for that.
Chairman Mao: (Looking toward Miss Shen.) The Chinese have a
good command of English. (To Prime Minister Chou.) Who is she?
Prime Minister Chou: Miss Shen Jo-yun.
Chairman Mao: Girls. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) Today I have
been uttering some nonsense for which I will have to beg the pardon
of the women of China.
Dr. Kissinger: It sounded very attractive to the Americans present.
(Chairman Mao and the girls laugh.)
Chairman Mao: If we are going to establish a liaison office in your
country do you want Miss Shen or Miss Tang?
Dr. Kissinger: We will deal with that through the channel of Huang
Dr. Kissinger: But they have done a remarkable job, the interpreters
we have met.
Chairman Mao: The interpreters you have met and our present interpreters
who are doing most of the work are now in their twenties
and thirties. If they grow too old they don’t do interpretation so well.
Prime Minister Chou: We should send some abroad.
Chairman Mao: We will send children at such a height (indicating
with his hands), not too old.
Dr. Kissinger: We will be prepared to establish exchange programs
where you can send students to America.
Chairman Mao: And if among a hundred persons there are ten
who are successful learning the language well, then that would be a
remarkable success. And if among them a few dozens don’t want to
come back, for example, some girls who want to stay in the United
States, no matter. Because you do not exclude foreigners like Chinese.
In the past the Chinese went abroad and they didn’t want to learn the
local language. (Looking toward Miss Tang) Her grandparents refused
to learn English.6 They are so obstinate. You know Chinese are very
obstinate and conservative. Many of the older generation overseas Chinese
don’t speak the local language. But they are getting better, the
younger generation. (…)
Chairman Mao: We have so many women in our country that don’t
know how to fight.
Miss Tang: Not necessarily. There are women’s detachments.
Chairman Mao: They are only on stage. In reality if there is a
fight you would flee very quickly and run into underground shelters.
Miss Wang: If the minutes of this talk were made public, it would
incur the public wrath on behalf of half the population.
Chairman Mao: That is half of the population of China.
Prime Minister Chou: First of all, it wouldn’t pass the Foreign
Chairman Mao: We can call this a secret meeting. (Chinese laughter)
Should our meeting today be public, or kept secret?
Dr. Kissinger: It’s up to you. I am prepared to make it public if
Chairman Mao: What is your idea? Is it better to have it public or
Dr. Kissinger: I think it is probably better to make it public.
Chairman Mao: Then the words we say about women today shall
be made nonexistent. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: We will remove them from the record. (Laughter)
We will start studying this proposal when I get back.
Chairman Mao: You know, the Chinese have a scheme to harm the
United States, that is, to send ten million women to the United States
and impair its interests by increasing its population.
Dr. Kissinger: The Chairman has fixed the idea so much in my
mind that I’ll certainly use it at my next press conference. (Laughter)
Chairman Mao: That would be all right with me. I’m not afraid of
anything. Anyway, God has sent me an invitation.
Todo esto es más curioso todavía si tenemos en cuenta que Mao es conocido por ser un partidario de la expansión demográfica de China como una arma importante ante la posibilidad de una guerra nuclear mundial.
Pero hay partes más interesantes, sin duda. Como la parte sobre Hitler o sobre las posibles acciones frente a una guerra con la URSS:
Chairman Mao: If there are Russians going to attack China, I can
tell you today that our way of conducting a war will be guerrilla
war and protracted war. We will let them go wherever they want.
(Prime Minister Chou laughs.) They want to come to the Yellow
River tributaries. That would be good, very good. (Laughter) And if
they go further to the Yangtse River tributaries, that would not be bad
Dr. Kissinger: But if they use bombs and do not send armies?
Chairman Mao: What should we do? Perhaps you can organize a
committee to study the problem. We’ll let them beat us up and they
will lose any resources. They say they are socialists. We are also socialists
and that will be socialists attacking socialists.
Dr. Kissinger: If they attack China, we would certainly oppose
them for our own reasons.
Y continua interesante Kissinger cuando habla de Europa (continua):
Chairman Mao: But your people are not awakened, and Europe
and you would think that it would be a fine thing if it were that the ill
water would flow toward China.
Dr. Kissinger: What Europe thinks I am not able to judge. They cannot
do anything anyway. They are basically irrelevant. (In the midst of
this Chairman Mao toasts Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord with tea.) What we
think is that if the Soviet Union overruns China, this would dislocate the
security of all other countries and will lead to our own isolation.
Y en otro encuento con Chou En-Lai Kissinger continua:
The first possibility, that we want the Soviet Union to defeat China.
If this were to happen, I am assuming from history that Japan would
end up on the side that looks stronger to Japan. That has always been
the case. If China were to be defeated, Japan would join the Soviet
Union. Europe would become like Finland, and the United States
would be completely isolated. So whether the Soviet Union defeats
China first or Europe first, the consequences for us will be the same.
So this can never be our policy. (…)
Indeed, under the
pressure of their Communist parties, and even worse, of those intellectuals
who listened to the communists without having their discipline,
they adopted the view that every crisis was the result of America’s
policy and the only danger of war was American intransigence,
not Soviet. So every European leader was in the happy position that
when he needed some cheap popularity he could come to Washington
and recommend détente, secure in the knowledge that we would refuse
him. [laughter] In the spring of 1971 a European leader came to
Washington to lecture us again about our intransigent policy and I said
to him, “You had better enjoy this trip, because very soon you will be
in a position where you will have to be very careful what you recommend
because we might accept it.” [laughter]
So if you compare the defense efforts of the Europeans before 1971
with after 1971, it is actually higher today. Now, how is this paradox
to be explained? Until 1971 the Europeans wanted to make sure that if
there was a war—they had exactly the opposite view of Brezhnev in
his communication to us—they wanted to make sure it would devastate
the U.S. but not devastate Europe. So they made just enough of an
effort to induce us to keep our forces there but never enough of an effort
so that we could actually defend Europe in Europe. (…)
Y sobre Japón:
Dr. Kissinger: May I ask the Prime Minister what I can tell the
PM Chou: You can tell them what is in the communiqué.
Dr. Kissinger: That is the absolute maximum I would tell them.
[laughter] There is no possibility that I will tell them more. I am trying
to figure out a way to tell them less.
PM Chou: You can say for instance that both our sides expressed appreciation
about the establishment of diplomatic relations between China
and Japan and that we believed this was in the interests of peoples of the
three countries and the other people in Asia and the Pacific Ocean.
Dr. Kissinger: I will certainly say that. Let me suggest this about
the Liaison Office. I will say only that we agreed to establish some form
of contact and we will still exchange messages about what it is. But
then you should not tell them any more.
PM Chou: We won’t say anything.
Dr. Kissinger: Our view about Japan is—I didn’t tell the Prime
Minister—we agree with his analysis, and the dangers. Why we didn’t
En general las minutas muestran el desconocimiento mutuo, y en especial por la parte China sobre el funcionamiento de la política norteamericana y las relaciones internacionales en general.. Existen muchas preguntas sobre las posibilidades de mantener actuaciones secretas, del papel del Congreso en la toma de decisiones, etc. por parte de Estados Unidos. Los chinos están obsesionados en la posibildad de un ataque soviético y quieren saber que hará EEUU, también comercio y Japón, Israel, Finlandia, Sri Lanka, India, Kashmir, Gaddafi y su intento de comprar Malta, Camboya, Korea, etc… un apasionante debate sobre la realidad mundial de 1973. Sin duda, las mejores minutas son entre Kissinger y Chou En-Lai, y pese a todos los peses, debemos reconocer la maestría de Kissinger.