Category Archives: china

¿Super-ministerios o super-misterios?

“If even the best tea goes through six layers of filters, then in the end all you get is bottled water,” decía Mao en referencia a la sobre-burocratización.
La reforma burocrática anunciada por Wen ayer, pero que lleva debatiéndose desde noviembre, no parece que vaya a ser más importante a nivel organizativo y de funcionamiento, que las otras y en especial la útlima del 2003, sin embargo si que puede mostrar una lucha de poder importante en el seno del gobierno y el partido.
Xinhua explica la reforma hacia un sistema de grandes ministerios (dabuwei tizhi), que a primera vista parece que tiene características continuistas con la re-centralización y re-concentración, para intentar así tener un mayor control y coordinación de los procesos y tareas de la siempre difícil y opaca burocrácia china. En ChinaDaily podemos leer esta expliación:

After China started economic reforms in the late 1970s, the administrative had to adjust to a fledgling market economy. The administrative has undergone five major restructures since 1982. One of the common missions was to streamline the administrative according to the goals of the economic reform at the time.

In 1982, the central government had 100 subordinating departments, which were cut down to 61 after the restructure. The 1998 restructure reduced the subordinating departments of the State Council from 40 to 29. The departments removed were mostly those directly governing the industries.

Admittedly, the governing structure of the administrative has been remarkably improved compared with that under the strict planned economy. But it obviously needs further reforms to better match the needs of the market economy.

There are 28 departments at the ministerial level under the central government, which is much more than those in a mature market economy. The Japanese government has 12 ministerial-level departments, the United States 15, and Britain, 17.

Sin embargo, como destaca Fengchun en IPSnews, que nadie se equivoque, esto no es una reforma para la democratización ni la lucha contra la corrupción, es en la lucha entre los diferentes órganos y agencias del Estado frente a la iniciativa privada, así como entre el Estado Central y las provincias. Es un intento de reforzar el gobierno central frente a otros actores políticos:

“An administrative reform has nothing to do with a comprehensive political reform,” says Yang Fengchun, a political scientist with Beijing University. “If the goal is to make low-level officials more accountable to their upper ranks and not to the public, then we are not talking about any change in the political system”.

El The Guardian también tiene un magnífico analisis sobre la reforma y como complementa muy bien este artículo en Forbes, queda mucho por hacer:

Power has not yet been separated into legislative, executive and supervisory branches, and many departments still have the authority to set their own budgets, he said.

‘The budgetary functions (of existing ministries) should be unified to form a new budgetary system, a budget office run by the State Council or under the direct responsibility of the president or premier,’ he added.

A mi parecer tiene la pinta de una reforma necesaria para que el gobierno central no se le continue escapando tantas cosas de las manos, y en este sentido podría ser positivo, y significar el primer paso hacia políticas económicas más de “izquierdas”, serias y activas por parte del gobierno para reducir el crecimiento económico, repartir la riqueza, etc. Sin embargo, esto va encontrar la oposición de las empresas (tanto publico como privadas), del capital extranjero, de ciertos gobiernos regionales, etc. Y deberíamos preguntarnos si una mayor eficiencia del gobierno es lo que necesita China, especialmente teniendo en cuenta el papel de liderazgo reformista que han tenido y siguen teniendo las elites locales y provinciales.

Otra característica es que parece que intenta acercar industria i telecomunicaciones, en un plan para potenciar la terciarización de la economía, por ahora tan basada en las manufacturas. Y también parece que podría priorizar el medioambiente con la creación de un nuevo ministerio, pero no quedan claras cuales van a ser sus atribuciones. Algunos analistas hechan en falta un ministerio de Energia, que al final no ha cuajado, pues parece que continuará la fragmentación en este sentido y que la NDCR continuará dirigiendo en los aspectos macro pero renunciará a los micro.

Y no va a ser rápida. Como ya vimos en las anteriores reformas administrativas, seguramente se va a tardar años en implementar completamente la nueva organización.

Finalmente, destacar que no parece que la reforma vaya a significar más transparencia, sinó más bien más concentración de poder y por lo tanto serán necesarias mayores iniciativas de control sobre la corrupción. Así pues, el funcionamiento real de la burocracia china continuará siendo un super-misterio.

Por 10 millones de chinas

Hoy incluso algunos periódicos españoles como El País destacan un pedazo de las conversaciones de Kissinger en China descalificadas recientemente por el Departamento de Estado norteamericano, y especialmente en la parte en que Mao hace referencia a la supuesta entrega de 10 millones de chinas a EEUU, sin duda una broma machista (que no marxista), de mal gusto, pero que puede entenderse especialmente si contextualizamos el momento histórico, leemos el contexto de relajación en la conversación y suponemos (como podemos intuir) la presencia de dos bellas traductoras durante la conversación con las que Mao flirtea. Aquí va el extracto del texto original pero no dudéis en leer todas las transcripciones, que son apasionantes:

Chairman Mao: The trade between our two countries at present is
very pitiful. It is gradually increasing. You know China is a very poor
country. We don’t have much. What we have in excess is women.
(Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: There are no quotas for those or tariffs.
Chairman Mao: So if you want them we can give a few of those
to you, some tens of thousands. (Laughter)
Prime Minister Chou: Of course, on a voluntary basis.
Chairmain Mao: Let them go to your place. They will create disasters.
That way you can lessen our burdens. (Laughter)
(…)
Chairman Mao: Do you want our Chinese women? We can give
you ten million. (Laughter, particularly among the women.)
Dr. Kissinger: The Chairman is improving his offer.
Chairman Mao: By doing so we can let them flood your country
with disaster and therefore impair your interests. In our country we
have too many women, and they have a way of doing things. They
give birth to children and our children are too many. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: It is such a novel proposition, we will have to
study it.
Chairman Mao: You can set up a committee to study the issue.
That is how your visit to China is settling the population question.
(Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: We will study utilization and allocation.
Chairman Mao: If we ask them to go I think they would be willing.
Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily.
Chairman Mao: That’s because of their feudal ideas, big nation
chauvinism.
Dr. Kissinger: We are certainly willing to receive them.
Chairman Mao: The Chinese are very alien-excluding.
For instance, in your country you can let in so many nationalities,
yet in China how many foreigners do you see?
Prime Minister Chou: Very few.
Dr. Kissinger: Very few.
Chairman Mao: You have about 600,000 Chinese in the United
States. We probably don’t even have 60 Americans here. I would like
to study the problem. I don’t know the reason.
Miss Tang: Mr. Lord’s wife is Chinese.
Chairman Mao: Oh?
Mr. Lord: Yes.
Chairman Mao: I studied the problem. I don’t know why the Chinese
never like foreigners. There are no Indians perhaps. As for the
Japanese, they are not very numerous either; compared to others there
are quite a few and some are married and settled down.
Dr. Kissinger: Of course, your experience with foreigners has not
been all that fortunate.
Chairman Mao: Yes, perhaps that is some reason for that.
(…)
Chairman Mao: (Looking toward Miss Shen.) The Chinese have a
good command of English. (To Prime Minister Chou.) Who is she?
Prime Minister Chou: Miss Shen Jo-yun.
Chairman Mao: Girls. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) Today I have
been uttering some nonsense for which I will have to beg the pardon
of the women of China.
Dr. Kissinger: It sounded very attractive to the Americans present.
(Chairman Mao and the girls laugh.)
Chairman Mao: If we are going to establish a liaison office in your
country do you want Miss Shen or Miss Tang?
Dr. Kissinger: We will deal with that through the channel of Huang
Hua. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: But they have done a remarkable job, the interpreters
we have met.
Chairman Mao: The interpreters you have met and our present interpreters
who are doing most of the work are now in their twenties
and thirties. If they grow too old they don’t do interpretation so well.
Prime Minister Chou: We should send some abroad.
Chairman Mao: We will send children at such a height (indicating
with his hands), not too old.
Dr. Kissinger: We will be prepared to establish exchange programs
where you can send students to America.
Chairman Mao: And if among a hundred persons there are ten
who are successful learning the language well, then that would be a
remarkable success. And if among them a few dozens don’t want to
come back, for example, some girls who want to stay in the United
States, no matter. Because you do not exclude foreigners like Chinese.
In the past the Chinese went abroad and they didn’t want to learn the
local language. (Looking toward Miss Tang) Her grandparents refused
to learn English.6 They are so obstinate. You know Chinese are very
obstinate and conservative. Many of the older generation overseas Chinese
don’t speak the local language. But they are getting better, the
younger generation. (…)
Chairman Mao: We have so many women in our country that don’t
know how to fight.
Miss Tang: Not necessarily. There are women’s detachments.
Chairman Mao: They are only on stage. In reality if there is a
fight you would flee very quickly and run into underground shelters.
Miss Wang: If the minutes of this talk were made public, it would
incur the public wrath on behalf of half the population.
Chairman Mao: That is half of the population of China.
Prime Minister Chou: First of all, it wouldn’t pass the Foreign
Ministry.
Chairman Mao: We can call this a secret meeting. (Chinese laughter)
Should our meeting today be public, or kept secret?
Dr. Kissinger: It’s up to you. I am prepared to make it public if
you wish.
Chairman Mao: What is your idea? Is it better to have it public or
secret?
Dr. Kissinger: I think it is probably better to make it public.
Chairman Mao: Then the words we say about women today shall
be made nonexistent. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: We will remove them from the record. (Laughter)
We will start studying this proposal when I get back.
Chairman Mao: You know, the Chinese have a scheme to harm the
United States, that is, to send ten million women to the United States
and impair its interests by increasing its population.
Dr. Kissinger: The Chairman has fixed the idea so much in my
mind that I’ll certainly use it at my next press conference. (Laughter)
Chairman Mao: That would be all right with me. I’m not afraid of
anything. Anyway, God has sent me an invitation.

Todo esto es más curioso todavía si tenemos en cuenta que Mao es conocido por ser un partidario de la expansión demográfica de China como una arma importante ante la posibilidad de una guerra nuclear mundial.

Pero hay partes más interesantes, sin duda. Como la parte sobre Hitler o sobre las posibles acciones frente a una guerra con la URSS:

Chairman Mao: If there are Russians going to attack China, I can
tell you today that our way of conducting a war will be guerrilla
war and protracted war. We will let them go wherever they want.
(Prime Minister Chou laughs.) They want to come to the Yellow
River tributaries. That would be good, very good. (Laughter) And if
they go further to the Yangtse River tributaries, that would not be bad
either.
Dr. Kissinger: But if they use bombs and do not send armies?
(Laughter)
Chairman Mao: What should we do? Perhaps you can organize a
committee to study the problem. We’ll let them beat us up and they
will lose any resources. They say they are socialists. We are also socialists
and that will be socialists attacking socialists.
Dr. Kissinger: If they attack China, we would certainly oppose
them for our own reasons.

Y continua interesante Kissinger cuando habla de Europa (continua):

Chairman Mao: But your people are not awakened, and Europe
and you would think that it would be a fine thing if it were that the ill
water would flow toward China.
Dr. Kissinger: What Europe thinks I am not able to judge. They cannot
do anything anyway. They are basically irrelevant. (In the midst of
this Chairman Mao toasts Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord with tea.) What we
think is that if the Soviet Union overruns China, this would dislocate the
security of all other countries and will lead to our own isolation.

Y en otro encuento con Chou En-Lai Kissinger continua:

The first possibility, that we want the Soviet Union to defeat China.
If this were to happen, I am assuming from history that Japan would
end up on the side that looks stronger to Japan. That has always been
the case. If China were to be defeated, Japan would join the Soviet
Union. Europe would become like Finland, and the United States
would be completely isolated. So whether the Soviet Union defeats
China first or Europe first, the consequences for us will be the same.
So this can never be our policy. (…)
Indeed, under the
pressure of their Communist parties, and even worse, of those intellectuals
who listened to the communists without having their discipline,
they adopted the view that every crisis was the result of America’s
policy and the only danger of war was American intransigence,
not Soviet. So every European leader was in the happy position that
when he needed some cheap popularity he could come to Washington
and recommend détente, secure in the knowledge that we would refuse
him. [laughter] In the spring of 1971 a European leader came to
Washington to lecture us again about our intransigent policy and I said
to him, “You had better enjoy this trip, because very soon you will be
in a position where you will have to be very careful what you recommend
because we might accept it.” [laughter]
So if you compare the defense efforts of the Europeans before 1971
with after 1971, it is actually higher today. Now, how is this paradox
to be explained? Until 1971 the Europeans wanted to make sure that if
there was a war—they had exactly the opposite view of Brezhnev in
his communication to us—they wanted to make sure it would devastate
the U.S. but not devastate Europe. So they made just enough of an
effort to induce us to keep our forces there but never enough of an effort
so that we could actually defend Europe in Europe. (…)

Y sobre Japón:

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask the Prime Minister what I can tell the
Japanese? [laughter]
PM Chou: You can tell them what is in the communiqué.
Dr. Kissinger: That is the absolute maximum I would tell them.
[laughter] There is no possibility that I will tell them more. I am trying
to figure out a way to tell them less.
PM Chou: You can say for instance that both our sides expressed appreciation
about the establishment of diplomatic relations between China
and Japan and that we believed this was in the interests of peoples of the
three countries and the other people in Asia and the Pacific Ocean.
Dr. Kissinger: I will certainly say that. Let me suggest this about
the Liaison Office. I will say only that we agreed to establish some form
of contact and we will still exchange messages about what it is. But
then you should not tell them any more.
PM Chou: We won’t say anything.
Dr. Kissinger: Our view about Japan is—I didn’t tell the Prime
Minister—we agree with his analysis, and the dangers. Why we didn’t

En general las minutas muestran el desconocimiento mutuo, y en especial por la parte China sobre el funcionamiento de la política norteamericana y las relaciones internacionales en general.. Existen muchas preguntas sobre las posibilidades de mantener actuaciones secretas, del papel del Congreso en la toma de decisiones, etc. por parte de Estados Unidos. Los chinos están obsesionados en la posibildad de un ataque soviético y quieren saber que hará EEUU, también comercio y Japón, Israel, Finlandia, Sri Lanka, India, Kashmir, Gaddafi y su intento de comprar Malta, Camboya, Korea, etc… un apasionante debate sobre la realidad mundial de 1973. Sin duda, las mejores minutas son entre Kissinger y Chou En-Lai, y pese a todos los peses, debemos reconocer la maestría de Kissinger.

What Does China Thinks?

A new intersting book about china politics by Mark Leonard, the author says in ECFR:

I am trying to show how experiments with focus groups and opinion polls are changing China from a traditional authoritarian state to a new ‘deliberative dictatorship’, and reveal how Beijing hopes to use a “China Dream” to challenge the US’ military power.

The book charts the development of a new Chinese world view and identifies the following different factions battling for influence:

  • The “New Left” who want a gentler form of capitalism with a social safety net that could reduce inequality and protect the environment;
  • The “New Right” who think that freedom will only come when the public sector is dismantled and sold off, and a new, politically active “propertied class” emerges;
  • The “Neo-Comms”, cousins of American neo-cons, want to use military modernisation, cultural diplomacy and international law to assert China’s power in the world.

I argue that in the future, the West willl be just as interested in the Chinese “Neo-Comms” plans for Asia as it is now in the “Neo-Cons” attempts to reshape the Middle East. Soon, the political struggle in the Communist Party will be seen as vital as the battle between the US presidential contenders; and protesters outside the World Bank will complain as much about the “Beijing Consensus” as they do about the “Washington Consensus”.

I have not read the book yet, but it looks like for Leonard there are no “technocrats” anymore… or maybe their views are shared for all three currents. If its a comparison with the US could be very interesting: how similar are the “great powers”?

At the ECFR webpage we also find another interesting article by F. Godement about the geopolitical consequences of the political change in Australia, Japan, Taiwan and SKorea:

These changes have powerful implications which Asia’s partners should consider. First, if there was a dream by conservative Republicans in Washington, and advocates of a strong Japan in Tokyo, to create an alliance of Asian democracies as a counterweight to China’s rise, that dream is over for the time being. (…)

Will China seize the opportunity and pursue key compromises on sensitive issues – Taiwan, maritime borders, divided Korea? Will it relax its political controls which stem from regime insecurity? Or will it merely use the moderation of its partners and the evident absence of any strategy of encirclement to further advance narrowly defined interests?

The Rise of China and the Future of the West

The Rise of China and the Future of the West
Can the Liberal System Survive?
By G. John Ikenberry

From Foreign Affairs , January/February 2008

Summary: China’s rise will inevitably bring the United States’ unipolar moment to an end. But that does not necessarily mean a violent power struggle or the overthrow of the Western system. The U.S.-led international order can remain dominant even while integrating a more powerful China — but only if Washington sets about strengthening that liberal order now.

You’ll be able to read the article here

Informe Anual Política China 2008

Por segundo año consecutivo, el Observatorio de la Política China (Casa Asia-IGADI) publica su Informe Anual en el que se aborda un repaso de la evolución política del gigante asiático en el último año, con especial atención a aquellos eventos, como el XVII Congreso del PCCh, que han marcado la agenda.

Además de incluir una muy resumida cronología de acontecimientos, el Informe Anual identifica los principales protagonistas del año en la política china, aporta los principales datos socioeconómicos, resume el ejercicio “en dos palabras” y efectúa su vaticinio acerca de los asuntos que primarán en la agenda china en 2008, obviamente, los Juegos Olímpicos de agosto, pero también el giro político que podría registrarse en las relaciones con Taiwán después de las decisivas elecciones presidenciales del 22 de marzo.

Informe en formato PDF

¿Base militar China en Iran?

Este artículo de Kaveh L Afrasiabi en Asia Times (aquí en castellano) sobre las posibilidades de que Irán permita a China establecer una base militar, lo que le permitiría expandir su poder en Oriente Miedo, más allá de su base en Pakistán (Gwadar).
Más interesante todavía cuando tenemos la notícia resiente de la construcción de una base militar norteamericana justo al lado de la frontera con Irán y que Francia ha llegado a un acuerdo con los EAU para establecer una base permanente allí también. Por todo esto el artículo se pregunta:

The professor loudly wondered how France would react if all of a sudden Iran started setting up bases near its coastline or, for that matter, how Washington would respond to an Iranian base in Iran-friendly Nicaragua? “They definitely need a wake-up call that national security is not a one-way process.”

Lo que vemos aquí es una típica situación de “dilema de seguridad”, sin embargo la idea no me parece del todo clara. No creo que Irán esté preparado para permitir una alianza de tal embergadura con China, y tampoco que China estaría dispuesta a pasar a una política tan abiertamente confrontadora frente a los EEUU.

En cuanto a bases, debemos destacar que los EEUU tienen la hegemonía mundial (ver gráficos), que les quedaba África y en octubre pasado con la creación del AFRICOM y la planificación de establecer 24 bases allí en 2012 se analizó como una clara respuesta a la nueva presencia de China en la olbidada África.

Termino con algunos links sobre bases miliares que me han parecido muy interesantes encontrados en el blog Critial Spatial Practice:

US Department of Defense Base Structure Report 2005 (PDF)

Outpost of empire / Wilber van der Zeijden / Red Pepper

America’s Empire of Bases / Chalmers Johnson / TomDispatch.com

Empire v. Democracy: Why Nemesis Is at Our Door / Chalmers Johnson / TomDispatch.com

Bases, Bases Everywhere: Pentagon Planning in Iraq, 2003-2005 / Tom Engelhardt / TomDispatch.com

737 U.S. Military Bases = Global Empire / Chalmers Johnson / AlterNet

Evolving Empire: Chalmers Johnson on Bush’s Major Troop Realignment / Democracy Now

Chalmers Johnson: “Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic” / Democracy Now

U.S. Military Bases and Empire / MAP (PDF) / Monthly Review

US Military Bases Around the World / Daily Kos

US Military Bases: The Spoils and Deceptions of War / Kurt Nimmo / CounterPunch

New US Military Bases: Side Effects or Causes of War? / Zoltan Grossman / CounterPunch

Bases, Empire, and Global Response / Catherine Lutz

ASIA

U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia / Lionel Beehner / Council on Foreign Relations

U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa, Japan (MAP)

No Crimes by U.S.Troops! / Korea

YONIP! Yes, Observe National Independence & Peace / Philippines

You have taken such a habit…

En el panel sobre geopolítica de Davos titulado “geopolítica de un mundo dividido” (se puede seguir a través del NYTimes) teníamos a tres asiáticos, dos europeos y un norteamericano (y no es un chiste) muestra de como cambian las cosas. Sin embargo lo que me interesa rescatar de este panel es la siguiente frase porque transmite perfectamente el sentimiento chino sobre occidente y en especial sobre EEUU:

When the moderator next turned to the Chinese representative, Ambassador Wu Jianmin, President of the China Foreign Affairs University, challenging China to be a more responsible and democratic global citizen, the soft-spoken Mr. Wu suddenly had an edge in his voice. “You western countries, you decide the rules, you give the grades, you say ‘you have been a bad boy,’” he said. “You have taken such a habit.”

Interesante la clasificación de habito (mal habito), de una mala costumbre como podría ser fumar o no lavarse los dientes. EEUU es como un niño malcriado que ha hecho de las suyas mientras los papas China estaban de vacaciones del poder internacional (el siglo de humillación), pero tranquilos, que ya han vuelto para poner las cosas en sus sitio. Que el niño se ha vuelto soberbio y aleccionador… que malos habitos.

Por otra parte podemos leer el artículo de Nye sobre las relaciones entre China y Estados Unidos en Project Syndicate que pese a que ambas sociedades tienen miedo una de la otra la guerra no es inevitable. En este sentido Nye aborda el tema de Taiwán y piensa que este problema no tiene pq llevar al conflicto entre ambos, pero que el miedo puede elaborar profecías que se cumplen a si mismas. Así:

“La política actual de Estados Unidos combina la integración económica con una protección contra la incertidumbre a futuro. La alianza de seguridad Estados Unidos-Japón significa que China no puede utilizar a Japón. Pero, si bien ese tipo de protección es natural en la política internacional, la modestia es importante para ambas partes.”

La palabra clave aquí es la modestia. Una vez más la ausencia de modestia se ha demostrado como un gran problema para ambas partes, especialmente por Estados Unidos (y occidente), que sigue dando lecciones (morales) a China, pese a tener sus propios pecados (y no pequeños).


China también está empezando a perder la modestia. Un ejemplo de Davos, sobre el superávit de la balanza exterior China:
Mr. Cheng pleaded jokingly for help from the rest of the world with the still-burgeoning Chinese surplus: “Just sell more things to us cheaper than made in China!” he said.

Todo esto lleva a la exageración, tanto en positivo (el super poder y futuro de China) como en negativo (los megaproblemas ecológicos, laborales, políticos, etc) y nos aleja de la realidad. Ejemplo de esto lo vemos y lo veremos en los Juegos Olímpicos de Beijing, que ciertos occidentales insisten en llamar los “Genocide Olympics” por Sudan (ver campaña), lo que me parece muy exagerado y seguramente contraproducente.

Más allá de la lucha en el medallero, los derechos humanos, etc… es curioso que el país que hasta hace poco emitía más emisiones de CO2 del mundo y que no firma Kyoto es uno de los abanderados en las exageraciones sobre la sin duda problemática contaminación de Beijing durante los Juegos Olímpicos, un elemento en que el gobierno se ha puesto a trabajar intensamente para reducirla durante los juegos (Atenas también tuvo que hacerlo). Falta poco para que alguien los titule los Pollution Games. Sin embargo en este artículo del IHT nos da una visión que parece que tan solo con salir a la calle en Beijing corremos riesgo de muerte:

To protect the athletes, Wilber is encouraging them to train elsewhere and arrive in Beijing at the last possible moment. He is also testing possible Olympians to see if they qualify for an International Olympic Committee exemption to use an asthma inhaler. And, in what may be a controversial recommendation, Wilber is urging all the athletes to wear specially designed masks over their noses and mouths from the minute they step foot in Beijing until they begin competing. (…)
“When you are coughing up black mucus, you have to stop for a second and say: ‘O.K., I get it. This is a really, really bad problem we’re looking at,’ ” he said.

Si quieren un gráfico con los problemas que les puede causar respirar el “Beijing Air” aquí lo pueden consultar.

Finalmente debemos destacar el artículo de Minxing Pei y Wayen Chen en Financial Times. Minxing Pei, conocido por sus magníficos artículos críticos sobre el futuro de China, ha realizado un artículo que yo estaba esperando: ante la crisis económica que se avecina y que parece que tarde o temprano afectará también a China (Batson no está de acuerdo, otros dicen que llegará después de los Juegos Olímpicos llegará a China), el gobierno tiene la oportunidad de profundizar sus reformas económicas y políticas hacia una mejor gobernanza.

Because economic performance and, by extension, a booming stock market help legitimise the ruling Communist party, a collapse in equity prices will seriously damage the leadership’s credibility as competent technocrats. Therefore, the Chinese government needs to develop a political strategy that will contain the political fallout from a market collapse while using it as an opportunity to push through financial sector reforms to restore investor confidence.

Esto es, la legitimidad del gobierno se basa en el crecimiento económico y ¿que pasa si este se acaba? Pues que el gobierno tiene que potenciar otras formas de legitimidad y mejorar la gobernanza. Y es que las lecciones, si son realizadas por alguien que tiene apellido chino, parecen menos occidentales…

Lo que pasa es que occidente tiene miedo de China y como reacción se vuelve más soberbio y menos modesto. Ante el final de la hegemonía económica sólo nos queda la moral (y la militar) y nos volvemos menos modestos, somos más críticos, etc… porque nuestro modelo, nuestros valores, nuestra supremacía está en entredicho y debemos reafirmarnos. De momento China calla, aguanta el chaparrón y sigue con lo suyo, pero se va a cansar, si no lo está ya, y cuando sea el momento nos va a mandar a paseo como hizo Wu Jianmin.

Occidente fruto de una coyuntura de supremacía militar, económica, tecnológica y cultural ha cogido malos hábitos como promocionar y aleccionar sobre su modelo de democracia, los derechos humanos, consenso de Washington, etc… y si cambia la coyuntura (y está cambiando), los hábitos también tendrán que cambiar.