Category Archives: foreign policy

Nuevas dinámicas para la política exterior española

Publicado por Iberglobal

10 claves para la necesaria recuperación de la política exterior española

Existe un cierto consenso de que la política exterior española ha perdido seriamente impulso durante la legislatura que está a punto de terminar. La polarización en temas internos (terrorismo, autonomías), la falta de interés del presidente del gobierno, la ruptura de cualquier posibilidad de consenso debido a la política de crispación y oposición a todo del Partido Popular, son algunos de los factores que se han mencionado para explicar la pérdida de importancia de la política exterior (…)

(Leer artículo íntegro y recomendaciones concretas en la fuente original)

¿Un Estado de las Autonomías para China?

Xuilo Ríos acaba de publicar en el Observatorio de Política China una interesante propuesta con un interesante enfoque: China y el problema de España como ventaja comparativa. La idea es ofrecer la experiencia del modelo autonómico de España a China, sin embargo hay algunas cuestiones que creo deberían considerarse:

1- ¿Puede aplicarse el modelo para Taiwan? En España el Estado de la Autonomías se ha caracterizado por el “café para todos”, esto es, dar a todas las autonomías las mismas posibilidades y competencias (almenos a nivel formal). No entraremos aquí en los pros y contras de este sistema, pero me parece muy diferente de la máxima “una china, dos sistemas”.Sin embargo Ríos no enfoca la propuesta en este sentido (que es la principal preocupación del gobierno chino), sino para hacer frente a las minorías.

2- Por otra parte, categorización de las minorías en China realizada por Ríos en base a los números no creo que sea la más acertada para el problema que plantea. El gobierno Chino ha tenido un doble enfoque, aquella minorías que no plantean problemas secesionistas (la grandisima mayoría de las minorías) y a las que ha incluso apoyado y reforzado a diferencia de las tres problemáticas (uigures, tibetanos y, menos, mongoles) y que ya tienen un estatus de provincias autónomas (de jure, que no de facto).


3- El trato a la minorías no problemáticas ha sido relativamente bueno, viendose excluidas de las políticas de hijo único por ejemplo, y actualmente su número, el 8% de la población total ha augmentado. Incluso vemos el caso de numerosos matrimonios mixtos entre hans y una minoria en el que se prefiere la identidad de la minoría a la han para conseguir algunos beneficios. Un ejemplo típico de este reconocimiento lo encontramos en la moneda del Estado, en las que vemos diferentes minorías representadas (excepto el de 100 yuanes con Mao, han) y diferentes (4) alfabetos. Sin embargo este reconocimiento ha sido más bien folclórico y asumiendo cierta superioridad han incontestable.

4- Las tres minorías problemáticas, en terminos secesionistas no han recibido un trato parecido sino que han sido reprimidas y continuan siendolo. En este sentido es interesante considerar que el Dalai Lama no pide la independencia de China, sino más autonomia, a diferencia de algunos uigures que piden la creación de un Estado independiente (Turkestan este).

5- El último problema es saber si el gobierno chino va realmente a tener interés en debatir estos temas, si el tema esta suficientemente maduro y si el gobierno lo quiere incorporar en la agenda. El gran problema interno de China actualmente es la desigualdad económica, también el nacional es relevante, pero no el de las minorías étnicas sino el de Taiwán.

6- Sin duda existen similitudes y podría ser de mutuo interés intercambiar experiencias, pero en el texto parece que sea tan solo China la que tiene y puede aprender de España, cuando a mi parecer debería plantearse que ambas podrían aprender de las experiencias mútuas, especialmente teniendo en cuenta que el problema tampoco está resuelto en España.

Pese a todo esto el enfoque me parece innovador e interesante y una baza a tener en cuenta, pese a que la diplomacia Española tradicionalmente no ha considerado su modelo territorial (y sus autonomías) como un elemento importante a exportar. Sin duda, la riqueza cultural del país puede (y debería) ser más presente en la politica exterior española.

Finalmente, recordar que no solo China podría estar interesada, sino que otros países como Kazajastán han mostrado interés en el sistema político español y se han realizado seminarios e intercambios de expertos en este sentido, y en especial Lluc Lopez habló de las posibilidades y características de un modelo autonómico para Kazajastán en una de las reuniones en Astaná.

Reading reviews on "Japan Rising"

Kenneth Pyle published last march the book Japan Rising, that has been very welcome for a wide range of the achademy. In Asia Times we can read a good review written by Sreeram Chaulia:

Pyle deduces six persistent traits of Japan’s national style from its history. First is its attentiveness to maximizing power as a condition of survival in the world. Japan always allies itself with the dominant ascendant power, be it Britain, Germany or the US. Second, Japan is a pragmatic state with no great universal ideals or utopian visions. The conservative upper crust of Japanese leaders invariably rejects doctrinal approaches. Third, and most important, is Japan’s propensity to adapt to international conditions to offset its vulnerability. Its rulers always read the global “trend of the times” (jisei), not to change it but to move alongside it to their own national advantage.

Fourth, modern Japan always pursues regional autonomy or hegemony through differing means. Policies such as diversifying energy suppliers and limiting foreign direct investment are designed to shield the economy from foreign dependence. Fifth, Japan best exemplifies the logic of swiftly copying the successful practices of the great powers such as China in pre-modern times and the West thereafter.

The Japanese lack “barriers of cultural and religious self-absorption that impede learning from other civilizations” (…) What this implies is that Japan can never be a true hegemon that can spread its values and institutions to other states or multilateral organizations. It looks destined to remain a cautious adaptive power that receives more from the international system but gives less

The Economist also reviewed it and highlighted that:

By virtually any measure—trade, tourism, foreign students, immigration, cultural interchange—Japan is the least globalised of all the rich, industrialised democracies.

And Michael Green in Foreign Affairs also reviews it:

Pyle’s rich history offers an important corrective for those who believe that the future of Asian security can be assured through a bipolar U.S.-Chinese concert of power. Although increasingly aligned with the United States because of growing uncertainty about its external environment, Japan is an independent variable, and the Japanese elite will come to its own conclusions about how to safeguard Japan’s interests. A positive U.S.-Chinese relationship is in Japan’s national interest, but excessive U.S. accommodation of Chinese power at Japan’s expense will lead to increased hedging by Tokyo and a less predictable Asian security environment. (…) Despite Singaporean elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew’s famous warning to Washington that encouraging Japan to play a larger security role is like giving a former alcoholic a rum bonbon, Singapore is now at the forefront of efforts to expand Japan’s political and security role in Southeast Asia; Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand have followed suit. None of these nations — including Japan — is interested in “containing” China’s rise, but all are engaged in a curious mix of balancing and bandwagoning, and Tokyo is beginning to take advantage of that game.

Joseph Nye also cites Pyle’s work in his last article in Project Syndicate, and it concludes:

Japan has become more willing to use its power, and more aware of changes in the external balance of power. It is rising, but how? As one Japanese liberal commented to me, “this is our third response to globalization. What can we contribute this time?”

After reading all these reviews I bought the book and I recived it today… I can’t hardly wait to start reading it. I promise to make my own review afterwards.

The ASEM and G8 summits and the China peaceful rise.

EU and US are asking China to engage and make contributions to the global governance in issues like global warming, trade imbalances, Africa, nuclear conflicts, copyright piracy, etc… China non-interventionism foreign policy is getting less and less realistic in a globalized world and European are starting to look for the “discourse trap” in a Shimerferling way: “Creating a harmonious world will not come about by default.” those are the words of the British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett on a recent visit to Beijing. So China says it wants a harmonious world, but what is doing about it? The Chinese government response is that if they are not members of the G8 they should not be asked to take so much responsabilty.
Meanwhile we can see the first important demonstrations against an ASEM summit. Presstv.ir says: Less than 10 days before the G8 summit in the Baltic Sea resort of Heiligendamm, hundreds of anti-globalization protesters led fierce street battles with police in Hamburg on Monday as 43 European and Asian foreign ministers (ASEM) opened their two-day talks, DPA reported.

In Eux.tv we can read:

Beijing (dpa) – China is viewed as a reluctant player in addressing the world’s global challenges the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized nations will be tackling at their June summit.

Although not a member of the exclusive club of rich nations, how the seven leading industrial nations – US, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada – plus Russia are called, China has participated in their annual summits since 2003 as an observer.

In so-called outreach sessions the heads of the G8 countries will discuss global problems with China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico during this year’s summit to be held in Germany’s resort town of Heiligendamm June 6-8. (…)

As the world’s third-largest trading nation and permanent member on the UN Security Council, China has more than earned a global voice and no other emerging country would be more qualified as an additional member of the exclusive G8 club.

However, no invitation has been forthcoming and will not this year, as the current G8-President, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, has clearly indicated.

“Nobody has asked us so far. If we are not invited (to join) we are also unable to give any answer (if we would like to join or not),” said the Chinese official.

Regardless if it will be the G9, G10 or even the G15 said the official, what’s important is that the forum exists and all questions are discussed.

Meanwhile India is in a slightly better position, but EU and US are not pressing her like they are pressing the Chinese. But a recent poll by WorldPublicOpinion.org shows that the Peaceful Rise is successing… Most see China catching up with the Us, but few are scared.